Supreme Court Clerks as Judicial Actors and as Sources by Armstrong, Scott
Marquette Law Review
Volume 98
Issue 1 Symposium: Judicial Assistants or Junior
Judges: The Hiring, Utilization, and Influence of Law
Clerks
Article 19
Supreme Court Clerks as Judicial Actors and as
Sources
Scott Armstrong
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Courts Commons, Judges Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the Legal
Profession Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Scott Armstrong, Supreme Court Clerks as Judicial Actors and as Sources, 98 Marq. L. Rev. 387 (2014).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol98/iss1/19
  
SUPREME COURT CLERKS AS JUDICIAL 
ACTORS AND AS SOURCES 
SCOTT ARMSTRONG* 
The Brethren grew out of earlier work which Bob Woodward and I 
had done in exposing the events which became known as Watergate.1  
As a newspaper reporter for The Washington Post, Bob had covered 
(indeed, had driven) the evolving story of the burglary and its cover-up.2  
I had witnessed the unraveling of the cover-up as an investigator for the 
Senate Watergate committee,3 where I had the good fortune to 
participate in the discovery of the presidential taping system, an event 
that helped resolve the constitutional confrontation.4  We worked 
 
*  This Article is based on remarks delivered on April 12, 2014 at Marquette University 
Law School’s conference Judicial Assistants or Junior Judges: The Hiring, Utilization, and 
Influence of Law Clerks as a participant in a panel with Tony Mauro of The National Law 
Journal and Stephen Wermiel of the American University Washington College of Law and 
author of Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion (with Seth Stern).  The views expressed are 
mine alone.  The majority of my quotations from and citations to court documents are from 
three sources: materials we collected which appear in the text of The Brethren, the documents 
available online in the Lewis Powell Jr. Papers at Washington & Lee University, and the 
documents online at The Burger Court Opinion-Writing Database, many of which appear only 
in partial form.  Neither I nor the editors of Marquette Law Review have had the opportunity 
to review documents from the personal papers of the Justices (housed in collections at the 
Library of Congress and elsewhere) or to confirm the accuracy of the location of those 
documents.  See MANUSCRIPT DIV., LIBRARY OF CONG., HARRY A. BLACKMUN PAPERS: A 
FINDING AID TO THE COLLECTION IN THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (rev. ed. 2010); 
MANUSCRIPT DIV., LIBRARY OF CONG., THURGOOD MARSHALL PAPERS: A FINDING AID 
TO THE COLLECTION IN THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (rev. ed. 2010); WILLIAM J. BRENNAN 
PAPERS: A FINDING AID TO THE COLLECTION IN THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (rev. ed. 
2010); MANUSCRIPT DIV., LIBRARY OF CONG., WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS PAPERS: A FINDING 
AID TO THE COLLECTION IN THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (rev. ed. 2014); WASH. & LEE 
UNIV., A GUIDE TO THE LEWIS F. POWELL JR. PAPERS, 1921−1998 (2002), 
http://ead.lib.virginia.edu/vivaxtf/view?docId=wl-law/vilxwl00013.xml.  Citations to these 
documents consist of the name of the Justice whose papers contain the document, followed by 
the box and folder number. 
1.  BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME 
COURT (1979). 
2.  Woodward worked with fellow Washington Post reporter Carl Bernstein. 
3.  The Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities was chaired by 
Senator Sam Ervin and directed by Chief Counsel Sam Dash.  I was among the first ten 
members of the majority (Democratic) staff. 
4.  For a detailed explanation of how the tapes were discovered, see Scott Armstrong, 
Friday the Thirteenth, 75 J. AM. HIST. 1234 (1989). 
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together on The Final Days, which described President Richard Nixon’s 
last year in office.5  Our exposure to Watergate made us intimately 
familiar with the inner workings of the Presidency and the Congress.  
We knew that those two branches of government operated differently 
from any classic civics textbook formulation.  In fact, the details of 
Watergate represented a stark revisionist tale of how government 
works. 
The Final Days included our reconstruction of the Supreme Court’s 
handling of the Watergate tapes case, one of the most difficult 
constitutional entanglements it had ever faced.  This reporting on the 
Court convinced us that the public knew little of the Court’s internal 
processes.  As the pinnacle of the judiciary, the Supreme Court was the 
least understood (or perhaps the most misunderstood) of the three 
branches of the federal government.  While the Court was the most 
secretive and protective of its internal deliberations, it was possible for 
us as reporters to gain the confidence of at least some of the Justices and 
their clerks in order to document and explain how the Court actually 
functioned behind closed doors.  The Court’s internal deliberations were 
principled attempts to find working resolutions to the nation’s most 
complicated and irresolvable issues, while at the same time they were 
often highly charged battles of political and personal will.6 
As we began exploratory contacts with Justices and their clerks to 
set up confidential interviews,7 we recognized that we would not be able 
to interview them about cases currently before the Court.  Since cases 
decided and sent back to lower courts for further action might return to 
the Court, we needed to establish a temporal buffer to assure our 
potential sources that we had no intention of reporting on pending 
matters.  We wanted to cover a period that would allow us to track the 
 
5.  BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, THE FINAL DAYS (1976). 
6.  Neither of us had an interest in, much less a stake in, any highfalutin concepts such as 
“legal realism” or “sociological jurisprudence.”  We merely wanted to document the 
unvarnished details of what happened—what was said and done—from as many vantage 
points as possible in the greatest possible detail.  When we spoke with the Justices, we were 
focused on what they thought and felt about the cases and how they dealt with each other.  
We were only interested in what the clerks thought or said in so far as it documented what 
occurred within the chambers or between the nine Justices.  A harsh critique of our methods 
is presented in George Anastaplo, Legal Realism, the New Journalism, and The Brethren, 
1983 DUKE L.J. 1045. 
7.  All interviews were conducted “on background”; that is they were on the record—we 
could use the information—but only upon our assurance that the identity of the source would 
remain confidential.  With this guarantee, those to whom we talked were willing to give us 
information we would never otherwise have been able to obtain. 
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evolution of the Court’s approaches to the most compelling 
contemporary issues of the day: abortion rights and privacy; busing and 
affirmative action; capital punishment and due process for the accused; 
protections for speech and the press and limits on pornography.  We 
decided to go back nine years to the 1969 nomination and confirmation 
of Warren Burger as Chief Justice, a logical starting point as the Court’s 
membership shifted from the liberal majority of the Warren Court to a 
more conservative orientation with the addition of four appointments by 
Richard Nixon: Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harry Blackmun, 
Lewis Powell, and William Rehnquist.  Because we began our reporting 
in the summer of 1977, we chose to follow the Court from the 1969 
Term through the 1975 Term, which ended in June 1976, seven full 
Terms of the Court.8 
In a closed institution where decisions and processes were spread 
across nine chambers, we realized that, regardless of how cooperative 
the Justices might be, they were less likely to recall vividly and with 
precision what had happened in a particular case among the thousands 
of cases they had handled in their Court careers.  No one Justice could 
give us the hundreds of hours necessary to reconstruct what had 
happened across the seven Terms in each of nine chambers.  We were 
concerned that we could never convince Justices to actually pull out 
their files and go over decisions in minute detail.  Experience in dealing 
with large institutions had taught us that our best bet was to identify the 
clerk in each chambers who had worked on each key case and to use the 
clerk’s recollection to develop detailed year-by-year chronologies to 
guide our reconstruction of events. 
As Bob and I interviewed clerks, we prepared memos on carbonless 
six-ply paper.9  Our research assistant Ben Weiser cut and pasted the 
sections of the interview memos dealing with individual cases into case 
chronologies and sorted the details of each Justice’s political and 
 
8.  In order to explain how Warren Burger replaced Earl Warren as Chief Justice, we 
began with a brief account of the failed effort of President Lyndon Johnson to appoint his 
close friend Abe Fortas as Chief Justice and the ensuing controversy that resulted in a Senate 
filibuster and Johnson’s withdrawal of the nomination.  This left the appointment of a Chief 
Justice to incoming President Richard Nixon.  Shortly after Chief Justice Burger’s 
confirmation, Justice Fortas resigned from the Court under threat of impeachment and was 
replaced by Justice Harry Blackmun.  The illnesses and resignations of Justices Hugo Black 
and John Harlan in 1972 and the resignation of William O. Douglas in 1975 meant that, for 
the 1969–1975 Terms, we had twelve Justices to cover.  
9.  As I recall, these interview memos were usually between ten and twenty single 
spaced pages in length.  It would have been far easier, had computer technology existed at the 
time, to prepare these digitally. 
 390 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:387 
personal views, as well as the non-case specific interactions among the 
Brethren, into ever-expanding Justice profiles.  Our interviews with the 
Justices who were willing to see us were similarly sorted into case 
specific references and general reflections on their background, tenure 
and interactions with their colleagues. 
Our colleague Al Kamen, who had worked with us on The Final 
Days and was a better writer than either Bob or I, focused substantively 
on the context of each case, pulling the briefs and isolating the oral 
arguments which revealed the posture in which the case came up from 
the lower courts.  Utilizing his enormous insight and patience, Al 
became both the principal editor and the arbiter of our disputes, 
particularly those over focus and emphasis.  Al was an equal partner in 
the writing of the book.10 
The master interview files became the backbone of ever more 
detailed and nuanced questions as we covered the same ground with 
additional clerks and went back again and again to talk to the clerks 
most centrally involved in each case.  In this manner, we were able to 
trace how each Justice’s views had developed, solidified, or changed at 
each state of a particular case: the granting of cert; oral argument; the 
preparation for conference; the assignment of the majority author; the 
drafting of the opinions; the circulation of opinion drafts, dissents, and 
concurrences; the collegial process of accommodations to the final 
majority and dissenting opinions.  We had the advantage of starting with 
the final opinions published by the Court, but we soon saw that the true 
story of the Court’s work was in the melding of views, the galvanizing of 
seemingly conflicting approaches, and the building interpersonal 
relationships that reflected each Justice’s manner of persuading or 
otherwise influencing his colleagues. 
By the time we had finished our first draft, eighteen months into the 
process, we had spoken with most of the clerks who served during the 
seven Terms.11  Of the more than two hundred potential clerks we 
 
10.  Alice Mayhew, our editor at Simon & Schuster, was an important voice in focusing 
us on what the public most needed to understand about the Court.  The enormous task of 
cutting down what could have been a 3,000 page tome fell to Milt Benjamin, a colleague at 
the Post who cleverly assisted us in honing to the most interesting narrative thread.  Tom 
Farber, my longtime friend and a gifted writer, immeasurably improved the clarity of our 
prose. 
11.  Roughly speaking, each chambers had an average of three clerks per Term.  In the 
first two Terms we covered, Justices Douglas and Black had only two clerks.  In the last two 
years, each Justice was authorized to have four clerks, although few took advantage of it.  The 
departure of Justices Black, Harlan, and Douglas in the middle of Terms, after clerks had 
been hired, meant that those clerks were absorbed into other chambers, raising the average 
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identified,12 fewer than three dozen couldn’t be located or wouldn’t 
cooperate in any way.  Of the remaining one hundred seventy plus 
clerks, I believe that roughly one hundred forty clerks cooperated with 
us in describing details of their own experiences at the Court.  Of those, 
about seventy became what I would call “intimate sources,” describing 
in great detail the major cases on which they worked.  Typically, across 
each of the seven Terms, roughly twenty helped, of which ten or so were 
extraordinarily giving of their time and understanding.  Some sat for “all 
day” or “all night” interviews.13  I do not recall a chambers in which at 
least one clerk for each Term did not cooperate. 
I recall one interview that began at noon on a Saturday and lasted 
until 4 a.m. Sunday morning, when an exhausted clerk helped me carry 
to my car every piece of paper that had circulated among chambers not 
only during the clerk’s Term but also during the prior Term.  That 
treasure trove alone provided us with twelve legal file drawers of 
material.  In some chambers, all the Justice’s draft opinions and 
concurrences, whether eventually published or not, were bound and 
privately printed for the exclusive use of the former clerks, an invaluable 
resource for detecting the interplay between Justices and the evolution 
of final opinions, often where one Justice accepted language from a 
“circulated” draft by another Justice in order to secure that Justice’s 
joining the majority (or dissenting) opinion. 
As we collected thousands of pages of materials, we accumulated 
eight file drawers filled with unique documents from the Justices 
chambers, most of it from individual clerks.14  We winnowed this down 
to summaries and drafts with identifying materials removed, which we 
discreetly took back to other clerks to refresh their recollections.  The 
 
slightly above three per chambers per year. 
12.  In addition to the regular clerks in each of the nine chambers across seven Terms, 
we also interviewed clerks who had served in earlier Terms, particularly those who were 
involved in the screening of clerks for particular Justices.  Thus, our target group was roughly 
two hundred clerks. 
13.  One fortunate feature of our interviewing schedule was the large number of clerks 
who had settled outside of Washington.  Out-of-town interviews were often the most intense 
and productive.  Once we had traveled hundreds or even thousands of miles to visit a clerk, 
we were shown great hospitality.  On the other hand, the convenience of interviewing D.C. 
based clerks meant we could return again and again as the story came together. 
14.  This estimate is based on my own storage measurements.  Bob and I each had a full 
complement of files.  However, I recognize on writing this that we each had many boxes of 
additional documentation.  I think it is safe to say that if one were to include lower court 
opinions, briefs, and background materials, we accumulated over 600,000 pages of materials. 
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result was as deeply documented a historical project as any I have 
known.15 
Our commitment to protect our sources persuaded us that specific 
citation of particular documents, which might differ in various drafts, 
could lead to the identification of the chambers from which the 
document came.  This, in turn, by process of elimination would point 
toward the clerk in that chambers who worked on that particular case.  
We took this commitment to an extreme, rarely describing the 
documentary authority we had for particular details for fear of letting 
down our sources.16  In retrospect, I regret that we were unable to devise 
a manner to cite the details in the hundreds of specific drafts and private 
papers we had.17  While such a system would have made the book more 
credible from its date of publication, it could have potentially exposed 
our sources and shaken their confidence in our discretion.18  As we 
wrote the book, we narrowed our focus to concentrate on the cases that 
illustrated the laborious decision making processes of the Justices and 
thus to gradually remove the clerks from the story except as the bit 
players they generally were.  Our test of that standard was to some 
extent the reactions of the cooperating Justices themselves.  If 
something in a single clerk’s account could not be independently 
documented, we left it out. 
The most valuable documentary materials to which we had 
(sporadic) access were the Brennan chambers’ histories of key cases.  
Compiled by the clerk working on a particular case for Justice Brennan, 
the histories catalogued Justice Brennan’s view of the evolution of the 
Court’s thinking from the conference after oral argument to the 
circulation of the final opinions and dissents.  Justice Brennan’s clerks 
saw the circulations among the Justices as the draft opinions and 
 
15.  As the founder and director of the National Security Archive, a repository of 
classified and declassified government documents, I can say this with some authority.  In 
addition, in nearly five decades as a Watergate, Washington Post, and independent 
investigator, I have been involved in some of the most extensive documentation projects 
involving government papers. 
16.  One exception was our description of Justice Byron White’s own typewritten draft 
of his views on the death penalty where we describe precisely what “he typed on his ancient 
manual typewriter, with its several missing keys.”  See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra 
note 1, at 217.  Justice White had shared the draft with all of his clerks, and one or more of 
them has shared the language outside his chambers. 
17.  Not surprisingly, we had cooperation from others besides Justices and clerks who 
were privy to Court drafts and inside materials.  Since this is a sufficiently rarified cast of 
potential characters, I don’t feel comfortable saying more. 
18.  This non-trivial issue is still a matter of some disagreement since it is not clear to me 
that even on a source’s death are we free to disclose his or her identity. 
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dissents came into his chambers.  But they had the advantage of another 
detailed source of information.  Justice Brennan regularly debriefed 
them on the events at conference.  And Justice Brennan, the most 
natural politician among the Brethren, often visited with other Justices 
on their thinking and carefully tracked the interpersonal dealings among 
the Justices. 
The resulting tone of these histories, while not uniform, was more a 
political history of each case than a detailed explication of the evolution 
of each Justice’s thinking.  The tradition of the case history process 
reinforced a discipline in which Brennan clerks understood the 
accumulation of details and developments in other chambers to be 
relevant to this “extra duty.”  The rigorous curiosity of Brennan clerks 
provided a baseline of insight as they probed the highly educated and 
conscientious population of other clerks.  Despite speculation that the 
book was largely based on the Brennan case histories, it was not.  No 
one Brennan clerk provided us with a Term’s worth of case histories. 
While we did not have physical access to the histories for most of the 
cases we singled out for attention, once we were aware of the existence 
of the histories, we found that Brennan clerks were the most likely to 
have these resources to refresh their recollections with details of what 
happened in other chambers.  This in turn opened the doors to clerks in 
the other chambers who wanted to correct, reinterpret, or supplement 
what we had heard. 
Clerks from other chambers were also often the benefactors of 
detailed and candid debriefs from their Justices, particularly clerks 
serving Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Powell and eventually Blackmun.  
In cases of special import, Justices White, Marshall, Rehnquist, Stevens, 
and, on occasion, even the Chief Justice provided their clerks with 
critically important details about their own appreciation of the dynamic 
within the Court.  Justice Douglas, a study in arrogance and 
brusqueness, was the most taciturn with his clerks.  But because he 
tended to circulate a constant drumbeat of notes and drafts to other 
chambers to which his clerks were privy, they too developed a special 
insight.19  As a result, we could construct a matrix of the Justices’ 
thinking and personal exchanges for most cases.  In instances where we 
discovered a nuance which was particularly closely held, we were able to 
 
19.  As Justice Douglas’s intellectual capacity diminished in his later years on the court, 
this drumbeat slowed somewhat.  But it also gave his clerks an uncommon amount of time to 
kibitz with other chambers. 
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go back to the most cooperative and informed clerks to confirm and 
clarify details. 
The cases that make their way through the federal and state judicial 
systems to the Court are often the hard cases surrounding difficult issues 
that the other institutions of our society cannot resolve.  To some 
degree, the Justices use their clerks to sift through the cases that come to 
them for cert looking for ones that will best allow a resolution of an 
issue on grounds which best frame what they think are the underlying 
legal principals.  In other instances, a case may sound significantly 
different after briefing and oral argument or after other legal 
developments than it did when cert was granted.  This may suggest to a 
majority of the Court that the case should be decided on narrower, less 
legally consequential grounds, thus providing the other institutions of 
society additional time and opportunity to get a better grip on a tangible 
approach to the legal issues presented.  The melding of these contextual 
forces often gives the Court’s final decisions a certain opaque, almost 
Delphic quality.  Whatever the majority’s guidance may be, whether 
clear or opaque, may be made more obscure by concurrences designed 
to qualify or limit the impact of the decision.  Add to this mélange a 
proliferation of rigorous dissents, sometimes multiple dissents in the 
same case on different grounds, and one can understand the difficulty 
facing the lower courts, the Executive and Legislative Branches of 
government, the bar, and, most profoundly, those commentators and 
reporters who try to translate the import of the cases for the general 
public. 
Virtually every clerk with whom we spoke felt that the Court’s work 
was regularly, seriously misunderstood and sometimes deliberately 
misinterpreted.  Many clerks maintained that the Court had no 
obligation to provide more guidance than it did in individual cases.  But 
most clerks wanted the Court’s processes and dynamics to be better 
understood.  Despite the inherent risks in discussing their tenure as 
clerks, many found that the need to explain the Court warranted the 
risk.20 
Both the Justices and clerks who cooperated wanted us to appreciate 
the difficulty of formulating interpretations of the Constitution and of 
statutory framework sufficient to reconcile the various federal and state 
courts’ approach to the most difficult issues of the times, issues which by 
 
20.  While we guaranteed the clerks and the Justices anonymity from public exposure 
and from being revealed to their colleagues, there is always inherent risk when a source 
undertakes to challenge an institutional vow of silence. 
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and large continue to fester.21  Indeed, this was the uniform common 
purpose of the Justices who spoke with us.  I believe this desire to have 
the public understand the challenges they faced was the principal reason 
why none of the Justices, other than Chief Justice Warren Burger, 
discouraged their clerks from cooperating with us.22  And this was the 
reason why several Justices, across ideological lines, tacitly or explicitly 
encouraged their clerks to talk.23 
Our genuine confusion over the anomalies within the decision-
making process and our intense desire to better understand the Court 
became our biggest assets.  Our effort to “get it right” was the reason 
why so many clerks and the Justices expended so much effort to help us.  
Every difference of opinion among our sources allowed us to solicit 
more information to complete the picture. 
Generally speaking, the clerks we interviewed were not a shy group.  
They were confident, competent, and, by and large, articulate.  I suspect 
clerks today share this profile.  Yet having heard others at this 
conference characterize contemporary clerks of the last decade, I am 
struck with how different the clerks of the late ’60s and early ’70s were 
from those of today.  First of all, they were the product of the social and 
political upheaval of the time.  They virtually all knew both draft 
dodgers and those who served in Vietnam.  While they were not the 
boldest protestors of their generation, they all had informed views on 
the war in Vietnam.  They had either participated and marched in civil 
rights protests against racism or wished they had.  They knew about 
 
21.  Contrast this with the desire of a bloc on today’s Court to declare certain issues, 
such as the need for affirmative action, to be resolved and no longer warranting the same 
degrees of attention and scrutiny. 
22.  Notably, in his first Term as Chief Justice, Burger had issued a memo stating that  
[t]he confidentiality is not limited to the minimum and obvious aspect of preserving 
the security of all information within the Court.  Equally important is the private 
nature of everything that transpires in the Chambers of the Justice, including what 
he says, what he thinks, whom he sees and what his thinking may be on a particular 
issue or case. 
WOODARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at 34. 
23.  I suspect that critics of the foibles of Chief Justice Burger were more willing to be 
cooperative than his supporters.  But on most internal housekeeping matters, including his 
assignment practices, the Chief Justice had far more critics than supporters among either the 
Justices or the clerks!  In fact, to my memory, at least one Burger clerk from each Term 
assisted us substantially, although their understanding of the significance of internal events 
was often better informed by their interactions with other chambers than from the Chief 
himself.  Still, most Burger clerks went to great lengths to give a balanced and fair appraisal of 
the Chief Justice, warning us that his critics were inclined to be petty while candidly 
acknowledging that the other Justices held Chief Justice Burger in low esteem. 
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school segregation and the contemporary efforts to resolve its 
deleterious effects through bussing and other affirmative steps.  Attica 
had made them familiar with the crisis in our prisons.  Most had strong 
views about the disproportionate application of the death penalty to 
blacks.  Although most were white males,24 they knew women 
contemporaries who had dealt with unwanted pregnancy in an era of 
back-alley abortions.  They had read in The New York Times about the 
failures of United States military ventures abroad.  They knew in detail 
the official deceits contained in the Pentagon papers.  They had seen 
Watergate play out as the investigations unfolded and brought the crisis 
to the Court. 
The clerks we interviewed expressed a refined and vivid 
appreciation for the social issues of the day in other ways, too.  Many of 
them (if not the majority, then close to it) graduated from the Court to 
go into government services or to work for public interest law firms.25  
Far fewer than today went into corporate law, perhaps because they did 
not have an astronomically expensive law school education.  The clerks 
we got to know best tended to take their concerns about the 
institutional role of the Supreme Court back to the streets or into 
alternative applications of law in the social interest.26  A significant 
number went into teaching law.27 
Although I have no way of confirming this from in-depth exposure, 
the descriptions of the selection criteria used to select clerks today as 
provided by knowledgeable participants in the conference lead me to 
conclude that clerks from the last decade are a wholly different breed.28  
While recent clerks have more experience after law school in major 
firms or the government, even in the Solicitor General’s office, they 
seem to be narrower gauge in other ways.  Based solely on their earning 
 
24.  Only half a dozen women clerks served during the seven Terms we covered.  One of 
these clerks was the only African-American clerk to serve during those seven Terms. 
25.  Simply put, we came to admire the integrity and publicly spiritedness of many of the 
people we interviewed. 
26.  These activities include founding many of the most significant law and social policy 
organizations which continue to do important work today. 
27.  I understand from the Conference that many former clerks go into law school 
teaching, but I have the impression it is a substantially smaller proportion.  See Artemus 
Ward, Christina Dwyer & Kiranjit Gill, Bonus Babies Escape Golden Handcuffs: How Money 
and Politics Has Transformed the Career Paths of Supreme Court Law Clerks, 98 MARQ. L. 
REV. 227, 233 fig.1, 236 fig.3 (2014). 
28.  While many of the clerks in the Brethren era were identifiably politically liberal and 
a smaller number clearly more conservative, there were no membership organizations which 
gave them credentials required for selection, the way contemporary clerks are often “pre-
qualified” by membership in the Federalist Society or the American Constitution Society. 
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capacity, they are far more likely to see themselves as members of an 
elite destined to be part of the One-Percent.29  I came away from the 
conference struck by the differences in character of “The Brethren 
clerks” versus those typifying today’s clerks.  I do not mean to impugn 
the honesty or commitment of contemporary clerks, with whom I am 
only sparingly familiar, but they have projected vastly different career 
paths. 
To varying degrees, the Brethren clerks served as a direct and 
immediate feedback loop for the Justices.  In the isolated confines of an 
institution where many Justices eschew active social calendars,30 Justices 
spend far more time with their clerks than with anyone else.31  The 
clerks traditionally become members of a surrogate family.32  As is the 
case of any family, the clerks expose the Justices to the more 
contemporary values of American society.33  While I strongly suspect 
that this degree of Justice-clerk collegiality continues today, I also 
suspect that today’s clerks bring less insight into the cultural nuances 
and societal fringes that the Justices will inevitably encounter in cases. 
I don’t mean to imply that the clerks we interviewed for The 
Brethren felt they were in charge of a reevaluation by the Court of 
contemporary American society or a rewriting of “the law.”  But we 
found that a clerk’s proximity to, if not actual participation in, the social 
change of the time had significant impact in some of the chambers.  It 
would be too strong to say the Brethren clerks saw themselves as the 
 
29.  I confess to being astounded by the characterization at the conference of 
contemporary clerks as typically feeling they had to serve in corporate law firms where 
starting salaries are well into six figures and signing bonuses are typically over $250,000. 
30.  I believe that the Justices on the contemporary Court are more active participants in 
the social life of Washington than the Justices were in the seven Terms we covered in the 
book. 
31.  Although the contemporary Court may include Justices who are considerably more 
social than the Justices who sat during the years of our book, I suspect, given the workload 
during the Term, this statement applies to spouses, children, friends, professional peers (if 
there is such a category), or even with each other.  
32.  Three of the Justices serving when we began the book—Justices Byron White, 
William Rehnquist and John Paul Stevens—had themselves clerked at the Court.  The same 
number of Justices on the current Court were clerks—Chief Justice John G. Roberts and 
Justices Stephen G. Breyer and Elena Kagan. 
33.  The clerks were by no means social peers of their Justices, but there were 
opportunities beyond the clerks’ work day.  Any clerk interested in a rough competitive game 
of basketball could meet Justice Byron White on the “Highest Court of the Land,” the half 
court on the fifth floor of the Supreme Court.  Justice Black regularly played tennis with his 
clerks.  Justice Blackmun breakfasted daily with his clerks and spent most of the time 
discussing the news of the day and sports, rather than cases. 
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Court’s conscience, but they were a de facto reflection of the country’s 
conscience. 
It seemed to me that clerks who served between 1969 and 1975 were 
possessed of what today would be an uncommon courage in speaking 
up, including speaking up to their Justices.  It was not so much a “Truth 
to Power” brigade as it was a generation that collectively heard and 
expressed concerns about the roots of broad societal dissatisfaction with 
the status quo.  The ethos of at least a dozen clerks in each year assured 
that any Justice susceptible to broadening the context in which he saw a 
case could do so by listening to the views of his clerks.  There was in 
each Term a cadre of clerks willing to listen to the non-traditional voices 
in society, to hash over that message among themselves.  In most Terms 
this was a fairly assertive and vocal group whose views would get to the 
Justices willing to listen.  At the same time, it is important to remember 
that clerks from this period were predominantly middle-class white 
males whose concern for their own careers restrained them.  They were 
certainly not at the Court to antagonize their bosses. 
The Brethren Court Justices, with their conservative and liberal 
wings balanced at the center, may have had a greater willingness to 
listen to voices with which they were unfamiliar than those on the 
contemporary court.  This may have also been enhanced by the turmoil 
in American society at the time and given them a greater willingness to 
bridge the gap between briefs which could not possibly capture the 
nuance of context within some of the most important cases.  From my 
perspective there were more Justices from 1969 to 1975 than there are 
today who—across an ideological spectrum—were willing to 
compromise in search of resolutions less ideological than practical.  This 
is not to say that they were more susceptible to public opinion or the 
views of clerks in their chambers than Justices today.  Surely Chief 
Justices Burger and Justice Rehnquist were examples of Justices largely 
resistant to such influence.  But the Brethren Court had members as 
conservative as Justices John Harlan and Harry Blackmun who did hear 
things from their clerks which helped them better appreciate that the 
context in which the cases came to them went beyond the insight they 
could glean from the briefs and the artificial structure of oral 
argument.34  Similarly, after a few years of experience on the Court, 
 
34.  To varying degrees across different issues, I would put Justices William Brennan, 
Potter Stewart, Lewis Powell, John Paul Stevens, and, on occasion, Hugo Black and Byron 
White in this camp.  Justices Marshall and Douglas had both been exposed to more and had 
less to learn from their clerks.  
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Justices such as Blackmun and Harlan were more likely to appreciate 
the vast experience of Justice Thurgood Marshall with his store of 
practical experience in a race- and class-divided society.35 
The portrait of the current Supreme Court’s relation with its clerks 
as presented at the Marquette conference is strikingly different.  While 
selecting clerks with some ideological bias was not unheard of in the 
Brethren Court, there was nothing like the ideological recruiting and 
screening of today’s Court as described by the more knowledgeable 
participants at the conference.36  As cynical as a reporter can be about 
the institutions of government, I was taken aback by the screening 
mechanisms used to select clerks today.37  The degree of partisan 
screening by “feeder judges”38 for certain Justices now suggests a self-
fulfilling mechanism for institutionalizing the deep ideological divide on 
the current Court.  As a New York Times article recently suggested, 
In the last nine terms, the court’s current Republican 
appointees hired clerks who had first served for appeals court 
judges appointed by Republicans at least 83 percent of the time.  
Justice Thomas hired one clerk from a Democratic judge’s 
chambers, Justice Scalia none. 
The numbers on the other side are almost as striking.  
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Kagan 
hired from Democratic chambers more than two-thirds of the 
time.  Justice Stephen G. Breyer is the exception: His hiring has 
long been about evenly divided.39  
While it is impossible to extrapolate from these statistics alone, the 
advent of a clerk population most likely to be interested in corporate 
practice40 suggests the clerk feedback loop is more likely one of 
 
35.  See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at 282. 
36.  See Lawrence Baum, Hiring Supreme Court Law Clerks: Probing the Ideological 
Linkage Between Judges and Justices, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 333 (2014); Christopher D. 
Kromphardt, Fielding an Excellent Team: Law Clerk Selection and Chambers Structure at the 
U.S. Supreme Court, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 289 (2014); Panel Discussion, Judges’ Perspectives on 
Law Clerk Hiring, Utilization, and Influence, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 444–48 (2014). 
37.  Screening by the Brethren Court Justices was generally conducted by former clerks 
or law professors well-acquainted with the Justice.  Their criteria included such overtly biased 
attitudes as those of Justice Brennan opposing the possibility of women clerks until the 1974 
Term.  See SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 
386–89 (2010). 
38.  See, e.g., David R. Stras, Secret Agents: Using Law Clerks Effectively, 98 MARQ. L. 
REV. 151, 155–58 (2014). 
39.  Adam Liptak, The Polarized Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2014, at SR1. 
40.  Perhaps this propensity for corporate law has also penetrated the judiciary itself.  
Former federal Court of Appeals Judge J. Michael Luttig, who produced more than forty law 
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reinforcement rather than one that broadens a Justice’s view.  At the 
same time, in this age where Washington dysfunction and nonfeasance 
dominates the other two branches of government, one must consider 
that, however polarized the contemporary Court, it does do its business.  
The Brethren covered seven Terms involving nearly 1,000 cases 
during which millions of pages of briefs were filed and more than 20,000 
pages of opinions were published, which were in turn based on tens of 
thousands of pages of exchanged drafts and perhaps hundreds of 
thousands of pages of drafts that did not see their way out of changes.41  
When we distilled our final product, what remained concentrated on the 
most important, and thus often the most contentious, of cases, those 
dealing with the most difficult issues facing the judiciary and the society 
at large.  It was little wonder to us that our product did not capture the 
tedious and repetitive nature of most of the Court’s work, which, while 
important, was not controversial.  Instead, by the process of editing 
down to a readable narrative of those years, we were compelled to 
include that which was often the most poignant, the most heartfelt, and 
the most emotional.  The routine was by and large left on the cutting 
room floor. 
Since most of our readers would be reading for the first time about 
any of the inner workings of the Court—much less the unhappiness of 
the other Justices with the often heavy-handed, arrogant, and frequently 
insensitive style of Chief Justice Burger—there was a danger that 
readers would conclude that every passionate dissent was an expression 
of personal animosity among the Justices.  We tried to emphasize the 
unusually collegial and generally congenial atmosphere of nine men 
bound by a common responsibility.  There was little doubt that our first 
portrayal of enmity toward the Chief Justice’s reign would color the 
reader’s perception of an institution which had always been opaque. 
As we polished the final drafts, we grew to appreciate how 
dramatically different our portrait of the Court would be for those who 
were unfamiliar with its inner workings.  We did not fully appreciate, 
however, that our vivid collection of the Court’s most important 
moments in those seven years would cause consternation within the 
 
clerks for Justices Thomas and Scalia, has now quit to become the general counsel of the 
Boeing Company.  See Adam Liptak, A Sign of Court’s Polarization: Choice of Clerks, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sep. 7, 2010, at A1. 
41.  The opinions for the 1969–1975 Terms appear in volumes 396–428 of the United 
States Reports. 
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Court.42  As we checked the final details with our best sources, we 
realized that they were individually and collectively surprised at how 
much detail we had documented.43  From later accounts of the Justices’ 
reactions, many clerks who had cooperated with us became nervous that 
they might incur their own Justice’s wrath for cooperation.  As human 
nature dictates, many employed the classic ass-covering technique of 
expressing their shock to their Justices that others clerks had told us so 
much.  
The Justices took to covering their own posteriors by taking turns 
telling the Chief Justice and their colleagues that they had not 
cooperated with us.  After the first conference following the book’s 
publication, we received firsthand accounts from three Justices who had 
been sources about the nearly unanimous disclaimers offered that day.44 
The Chief Justice added a comedic denial of his own by announcing he 
would not read the book, only to be photographed later in the day 
through the backseat window of a limousine exiting from the Court’s 
underground garage with a copy of the book open before him. 
Many reviewers and commentators speculated that, because clerks 
had broken some unwritten but presumed confidentiality agreement, 
The Brethren caused a lasting internal upheaval within the Court.  Two 
consequences were frequently cited. 
 
42.  In order to be sure we had been technically correct on the procedural details and 
that our attempt to tell the story in plain English was still consistent with the legal 
community’s norms and understanding, we asked several people to read a draft and give us 
their candid reactions.  Among those readers were Stephen Breyer, a former Supreme Court 
clerk from an earlier era who had been the Chief Counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
who is now himself a Supreme Court Justice, and Robert Reich, a former Assistant Solicitor 
General who later served as Secretary of Labor.  My former colleague on the Watergate 
Committee, Professor Ronald Rotunda, author of an outstanding series of treatises on 
constitutional law, gave us sound advice.  Douglas Woodlock, at the time an Assistant U.S. 
Attorney and for the last three decades a judge on the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts, provided thoughtful comments.  Two other associates from the Watergate 
Committee, Jim Moore, a former Second Circuit clerk, and Marc Lackritz provided helpful 
comments.  While in no way responsible for the content of the book, these readers helped us 
avoid misleadingly worded interpretations. 
43.  Several clerks read potions of the rough galleys covering events in which they were 
involved. 
44.  The release of the papers of several retired and deceased Justices has confirmed not 
only that individual Justices spoke with one or both of us but that they went to considerable 
efforts to disguise that fact.  Justices Powell, Stewart, and Blackmun were particularly worried 
that Chief Justice Burger and others would take a dim view of any cooperation, a concern 
that increased when certain events in the book appeared to have the advantage of their 
cooperation.  The extent of their efforts to appease the Chief Justice and convince him they 
were not sources varied. 
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First, it was alleged that the relationships between the Justices and 
their clerks were permanently damaged.45  In this view, clerks would no 
longer be privy to the internal workings of the Court because their 
Justices did not treat them as confidantes.  I do not believe the clerk–
Justice relationships have been altered in the book’s aftermath.  
Because their appointments for life have always dictated that Justices 
deal with each other in the most fraternal and collegial manner, their 
disappointments and frustrations are largely hidden under the veneer of 
formal courtesy and personal kindness.  But now, as before, when these 
hidden rough edges became most pronounced and most likely to impact 
the decision-making process and the substance of decisions, the Justices 
continue to share their frustrations with their most trusted colleagues in 
occasional moments of candor.  I believe these frustrations continue to 
be shared with at least some of their own clerks in the privacy of 
chambers.  The difference The Brethren made was only momentary.  
From the reactions of Justices after the book was published, it seems the 
Justices had not anticipated what a collection of their most unique 
interactions would look like back-to-back.  But once the internal norm 
of operational secrecy returned, the relations of candor with clerks 
returned, varying in accord with the personalities of the current Justices 
rather than some deep-seated, lingering concern over confidentiality. 
The second alleged consequence attributed to The Brethren’s 
publication was the impact it had on the Court’s view of secrecy in cases 
coming before it, in particular the United States government’s case 
against former CIA officer Frank Snepp.46  In 1977, Snepp published 
Decent Interval, an account of his service in Vietnam.47  The CIA 
attacked the book as a threat to national security.  After failing to get 
the Justice Department to halt publication because it could not prove 
Snepp had divulged secret information, the CIA succeeded in getting 
Justice to sue Snepp for violating the provision of his employment 
agreement in which he agreed to submit for prepublication review any 
information he intended to publish about the CIA.  The district court 
ruled in the CIA’s favor, enjoining Snepp from publishing information 
 
45.  See, e.g., William J. Daniels, The Clerks Talk: Commentary & Analysis of The 
Brethren, 44 ALB. L. REV. 732, 737 (1980) (book review); Michael W. Steinberg, Book 
Review, 66 A.B.A. J. 186, 188 (1980). 
46.  See, e.g., Victor S. Navasky, The Selling of the Brethren, 89 YALE L.J. 1028 (1980) 
(book review); Frank Barbash, Snepp Decision Seen Helping Court to Plug Its Own Leaks, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 1980, at A5. 
47.  FRANK SNEPP, DECENT INTERVAL: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF SAIGON’S END 
TOLD BY THE CIA’S CHIEF STRATEGY ANALYST IN VIETNAM (1977). 
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about the CIA without undergoing prepublication review and requiring 
that he forfeit all royalties to the government.48  The court of appeals 
concluded that Snepp had a First Amendment right to publish 
unclassified information.49  The court of appeals based its decision to 
reverse the constructive trust order upon the government’s concession 
that Snepp’s book had not revealed any classified information.50 
In response, the Court granted cert but issued a remarkable and 
unprecedented unsigned per curium opinion, summarily reinstating the 
district court’s imposition of a levy on Snepp’s profits while confirming 
the district court’s ban against further publication of information about 
the CIA without pre-publication review.51  Without benefit of briefs or 
oral argument, a majority consisting of Chief Justice Burger and Justices 
Stewart, White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Powell ignored the First 
Amendment issues raised by Snepp.  The per curium upheld the district 
court’s gag order on Snepp’s comments on the CIA without secrecy 
review and reinstated the confiscation of Snepp’s royalties.52  The result 
was more than the government had requested. 
The case drew considerable critical comment.53  Snepp and others 
alleged that the case, having been considered during the period of 
publication of The Brethren, represented the majority’s fury toward 
their clerks who had leaked.54 
Had the Snepp case fallen within the period we covered in the book, 
it would have become a centerpiece example of a single Justice’s 
extraordinary lobbying for his own iconoclastic and activist views as well 
as for its importance to First Amendment cases in the national security 
area.  Since we did not interview the participants and I have only been 
 
48.  United States v. Snepp, 456 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Va. 1978). 
49.  United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1979). 
50.  Id. at 929. 
51.  Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam).  See particularly the 
Stevens dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall.  Id. at 516–26 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
52.  Id. at 516 (majority opinion). 
53.  See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE 225–34 (1st Vintage Books 
ed. 1983); Barbash, supra note 46; Griffin B. Bell, Secrecy After the Snepp Case, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 9., 1980, at A21; Richard Cohen, Can Court Take Away a Constitutional Right?, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 6, 1980, at B1.  See also Thomas Goldstein’s review of The Best Defense.  Tom 
Goldstein, The Lawyer of Last Resort, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1982, at A13. 
54.  See David J. Garrow, The Supreme Court and The Brethren, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 
303, 304, 314–17 (2001). 
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able to review Justice Powell’s case files,55 I have to be more tentative 
than we would have been in The Brethren, where our accounts were 
based on full reporting. 
Justice Powell’s files show that the original votes on October 5, 1979, 
on both Snepp’s and the Government’s cert petitions, were 8–1 to deny 
cert.  This would have left Snepp bound by the injunction but without 
any levy on his royalties.  The single dissenting voice was that of Lewis 
Powell, who wanted to grant cert.  The case was relisted to give Powell 
time to write a dissent to the cert denial.  After assigning the case to a 
clerk for research, Powell completed a type written first draft, known as 
a “Chamber’s Draft,”56 on October 19, 1979, a remarkably quick 
response.  Powell continued to revise this preliminary draft several 
times.57 
Justice Powell wrote Justice Blackmun on October 31, 1979, and 
asked if he would review his draft dissent.58  Justice Powell told Justice 
 
55.  Justices Marshall and Blackmun’s case files should also be available, but I could 
only find Justice Powell’s online.  The difficulty of finding one document among hundreds 
and hundreds of pages in a single Justice’s case files is a vivid reminder to me of how 
important the clerks were in guiding us. 
56.  Many scholars of the Court fail to understand that there are often preliminary 
typewritten drafts which circulate informally among only a few chambers before the 
“published” or printed “First Draft” is circulated.  Since many of these chambers drafts in 
typescript are not retained by their authors or the selected Justices who become privy to 
them, scholars often miss the interplay between chambers that determines a case’s final 
outcome. 
57.  Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Chambers Drafts and Drafting Notes (Oct. 24−31, 1979), in 78-
1871 Snepp v. U.S.−Opinion Drafts, 1979 Oct. 24−31, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell
%20archives/78-1871_Snepp_U.S._Opinion1979Oct24-31.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2JM
W-94TS, in WASH. & LEE UNIV., THE LEWIS F. POWELL JR. PAPERS, 1921–1998: SUPREME 
COURT CASE FILES [hereinafter POWELL PAPERS], http://law2.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.
asp?pageid=1279, archived at http://perma.cc/85WG-R9EU; Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Chambers 
Draft of Snepp v. United States (Oct. 23, 1979), in 78-1871 Snepp v. U.S.−Opinion Drafts, 1979
 Oct. 23, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/78-1871_Snepp_U.S._Opinion19
79Oct23.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/HC4S-HQB4, in POWELL PAPERS, supra; Lewis F. 
Powell, Jr., Chambers Draft of Snepp v. United States (Oct. 19, 1979), in 78-1871 Snepp v. 
U.S.−Opinion Drafts, 1979 Oct. 19, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/78-187
1_Snepp_U.S._Opinion1979Oct19.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Z2ED-AA4P, in POWELL 
PAPERS, supra; see also 78-1871 Snepp v. U.S., WASH. & LEE UNIV.: POWELL ARCHIVES, htt
p://law2.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1762 (last visited Jan. 24, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/KP32-PJS6. 
58.  Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States 
(Oct. 31, 1979) [hereinafter Memo from Powell to Blackmun], in 78-1871 Snepp v. U.S., 1979 
Oct., http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/78-1871_Snepp_U.S.1979Oct..pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/RZ84-FU25, in POWELL PAPERS, supra note 57.  These also were 
apparently what Powell considered to be “chambers drafts” that were not circulated to the 
full Court.  See Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the 
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Blackmun that he wanted to reaffirm the district court’s opinion without 
argument and had already spoken to Justice Stewart, who expressed 
interest in a summary reversal.59  Justice Powell believed that if Justice 
Blackmun agreed, he could get four other Justices to join them and then 
he could get Justice Stewart.  Justice Powell also told Justice Blackmun 
that he was concerned that, even though the government did not want to 
have its case granted cert if Snepp’s was not, Justice Powell was 
“persuaded that it would be in the interest of our country to reinstate 
the District Court’s judgment . . . [, which] would require granting of 
both petitions, and a summary reversal only of the . . . judgment limiting 
damages.”60  Justice Powell told him the issue was “clear cut” and that 
he guessed “the government is nervous about this case, as it would be 
quite disastrous if Snepp’s cross petition were granted and this Court 
went on to invalidate the secrecy agreement altogether.”61  He noted 
that “[a] bill [was] still pending (according to what former Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk,[62] ha[d] told [him]) that would damage even further 
the capacity of the CIA to function effectively in the national interest.”63  
His files show that even before his initial cert vote Justice Powell began 
collecting news clips about the CIA reflecting his worry about their 
losing credibility and power in their contest with Soviet intelligence.64  
 
United States, to File (Apr. 10, 1980), in 78-1871 Snepp v. U.S., 1980 Jan.−April [hereinafter 
Snepp: 1980 Jan.−April], http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/78-1871_Snepp_
U.S.1980.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/99T8-8NX3 (referencing “Ch. Draft 10/24/79 
(Dissent)”), in POWELL PAPERS, supra note 57. 
59.  Memo from Powell to Blackmun, supra note 58, at 1–2. 
60.  Id. at 1. 
61.  Id. 
62.  It is unclear how Rusk communicated to Justice Powell.  Rusk was at the time 
battling with Frank Church over the plan put forth by the committee he chaired (the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence Activities) to release details of Operation Mongoose, the 
Kennedy administration’s efforts to have the CIA kill Fidel Castro, a plot that Rusk had 
endorsed.  See Thomas Powers, Inside the Department of Dirty Tricks, ATLANTIC, Aug. 1979, 
at 33, 37–38.  See also Dean Rusk’s testimony before the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence Activities regarding inquiries into Rusk’s involvements in assassination plots 
against foreign leaders.  Testimony of Dean Rusk Before the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, 94th Cong. 74−104 (July 10, 1975), http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/vie
wer/showDoc.do?docId=1365&relPageId=78, archived at http://perma.cc/F6MB-TBP9.  The 
Powell Papers also contain a Rusk Correspondence folder, which may shed further light on 
the two men’s relationship.  See Personal Correspondence—General, 1932–1971: Container 
List, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/Powell%20Archives/Correspondence_1932-1971.pdf 
(last updated Feb. 3, 2003), archived at http://perma.cc/MDG8-MNEH, in POWELL PAPERS, 
supra note 57. 
63.  Memo from Powell to Blackmun, supra note 58, at 1. 
64.  One article quotes former CIA Directors William Colby and Richard Helms on the 
problem and notes that the Russians had allegedly revealed the identities of CIA agents 
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On November 6, 1979, Justice Powell circulated his “First Draft” 
selectively to several Justices, including Chief Justice Burger and Justice 
Rehnquist.65  The same day, Justice Rehnquist agreed to join him in 
summarily ruling against Snepp and for the government.66  On 
November 16, 1979, Justice Powell formally circulated his first draft and 
immediately received notes from Chief Justice Burger and Justice 
Stewart for his dissent.  Justice Blackmun wrote three days later, saying, 
“You have written a persuasive dissent, and I am happy to join it.”67  
The next day, Justice Rehnquist formally joined the dissent.  On 
November 21, 1979, the dissent became a per curiam.  By the end of the 
week, Justice White had joined the others in the per curiam.68 
When Justice Stevens circulated his dissent to Justice Powell’s per 
curiam on January 3, 1980, Justice Powell wrote on his copy: “If this 
view prevailed the CIA might as well fold up.  If any agent may publish 
secrets at will, subject only to post-publication sanctions, there would be 
little assurance of the most important secret being secure.”69  To Justice 
 
abroad.  David Ignatius, Spy Wars: Experts Fear That U.S. Loses Espionage Battle with the 
Soviet Union, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1979, at 1, available at http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/pow
ell%20archives/78-1871_Snepp_U.S._Clippings.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6BVY-
NGEU. 
65.  Lewis F. Powell, First Draft of Snepp v. United States (Nov. 6, 1979), in 78-1871 
Snepp v. U.S., 1979 Nov. 16, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/78-1871_Sne
pp_U.S._Opinion1979Nov16.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/NJW8-BRGB, in POWELL 
PAPERS, supra note 57.  It appears that pre-first drafts also went to other Justices because 
Justice Powell’s files contain pre-circulation first drafts with hand-written suggestions that do 
not appear to be in either Justice Powell’s or his clerk’s handwriting. 
66.  Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to Lewis F. Powell, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States 
(Nov. 6, 1979), in 78-1871 Snepp v. U.S., 1979 Nov. [hereinafter Snepp: Nov. 1979], http://law2.
wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/78-1871_Snepp_U.S.1979Nov.pdf, archived at http://p
erma.cc/TND7-VY24, in POWELL PAPERS, supra note 57.  Justice Rehnquist’s hand-written 
note is difficult to decipher and speaks of joining Justice Powell in affirming Snepp’s petition 
and reversing the government’s petition, which appears to state it backwards but nevertheless 
is clearly a join. 
67.  Memorandum from Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to Lewis F. Powell, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States 
(Nov. 19, 1979), in Snepp: Nov. 1979, supra note 66. 
68.  Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to Lewis F. Powell, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States 
(Nov. 20, 1979) in Snepp: Nov. 1979, supra note 66; Conference Notes for Snepp v. United 
States (Nov. 21, 1979), in Snepp: Nov. 1979, supra note 66; Memorandum from Byron R. 
White, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, to Lewis F. Powell (Nov. 29, 
1979), in Snepp: Nov. 1979, supra note 66. 
69.  Lewis F. Powell, Annotated Dissent by John P. Stevens to Snepp v. United States 1 
(Jan. 3, 1980), in Snepp v. U.S.−Opinion Drafts, 1980 Jan. 3−9, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages
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Stevens’s assertion that “the reluctance of foreign governments to work 
with our government [if unclassified information is published] must be 
accepted as an inevitable by-product of the exercise of First 
Amendment rights by government employees,” Justice Powell wrote in 
the margin that Justice Stevens “[s]ounds like Frank Church,” the 
Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, which was actively legislating 
reforms of the intelligence agencies.70  Justice Powell revised his per 
curiam and sent his draft to Justice Potter Stewart alone on January 10, 
1980, and then, after many sets of full draft revisions, recirculated it to 
the entire conference. 
Despite the logic that the majority’s view of confidentiality 
agreements was influenced by the Justices’ own relationships with the 
clerks in the context of the publication of The Brethren, Justice Powell’s 
papers suggest otherwise.  Justice Powell lobbied the Court vigorously 
on behalf of the CIA.  From the Powell record, it would seem that from 
the moment the case arrived, Justice Powell was committed to giving the 
CIA the tools it needed to prevent any other CIA employee (or for that 
matter executive branch employee) from repeating Snepp’s sin of 
publishing information governed by a pre-publication review 
requirement, regardless of whether it included classified information.71  
Other clips reflect his concerns after the Snepp decision that it was being 
seen as “helping [the] Court to plug its own leaks.”72  He made reference 
in his files to the fact that he had circulated his dissent long before The 
Brethren was published in December 1979.73 
 
/powell%20archives/78-1871_Snepp_U.S._Opinion1980Jan3-9.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc
/EU8V-ZFD7, in POWELL PAPERS, supra note 57. 
70.  Id. at 6–7. 
71.  The historical record indicates that the White House of Gerald Ford identified 
Powell as one of the possible candidates to be Director of the CIA.  See Memorandum from 
Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President, to Gerald R. Ford, President of the United 
States (July 10, 1975), http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0005/1561476.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/3H2T-FVKS.  Justice White was given more serious consideration, 
according to the Ford papers. 
72.  Barbash, supra note 46 (title case omitted).  See id., across the top of which Justice  
Powell wrote, “A typically ignorant & biased view of a case perceived as denying use [of] a 
source of ‘leaked’ news.”  See Lewis F. Powell, Annotation to Barbash Clipping (Feb. 22, 
1980), in 78-1871 Snepp v.U.S.−Clippings, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives
/78-1871_Snepp_U.S._Clippings.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6BVY-NGEU, in POWELL 
PAPERS, supra note 57.  Justice Powell circulated these clips to those Justices who had joined 
the per curiam. 
73.  Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to File (Feb. 25, 1980), in Snepp: 1980 Jan.−April, supra note 58.  Despite a 
note in Justice Powell’s file that he circulated six drafts of his opinion, in reality he circulated 
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Two other factors suggest that the case outcome was not wholly the 
product of intemperate concerns about clerk confidentiality.  First, 
Justice Brennan, the Justice most aggrieved of The Brethren’s contents 
and most upset by the cooperation of clerks with our project,74 did not 
join Justice Powell’s opinion.  He stuck with Justice Stevens’s holding 
that the issues in the case were fundamentally First Amendment issues.  
And most important of all, none of the logic of Justice Powell’s opinion 
(in so far as the opinion had a logic) seems to have influenced the 
Court’s internal procedures.  No employment agreements or other 
written restrictions were imposed on the clerks, something that could 
easily have been implemented had the six Justices joining the per curiam 
insisted upon it.75 
Despite the initial outcry from Court watchers and the more 
conservative members of the traditional bar, few critics alleged or cited 
specific errors.  The most serious challenge to The Brethren’s accuracy 
came in a case, Moore v. Illinois.76  
 
many more, since at least six appear to have gone only to individual Justices and not to the 
whole Court.  At least one of these “pre-circulation” drafts was in typescript. 
74.  See infra notes 76–78 and accompanying text. 
75.  It may also be noteworthy that even Chief Justice Burger apparently made no effort 
to impose a secrecy agreement on the clerks despite the fact that he had written in the 
Pentagon Papers case that 
[n]o statue gives this Court express power to establish and enforce the utmost 
security measures for the secrecy of our deliberations and records.  Yet I have little 
doubt as to the inherent power of the Court to protect the confidentiality of its 
internal operations by whatever judicial measures may be required. 
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 752 n.3 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  
In March 1989, under Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the Court created the Code of 
Conduct for Law Clerks of the Supreme Court of the United States.  Canon Three of the Code 
of Conduct provides that  
[t]he relationship between Justice and law clerk is essentially a confidential one.  A 
law clerk should abstain from public comment about a pending or impending 
proceeding in the Court.  A law clerk should never disclose to any person any 
confidential information received in the course of the law clerk’s duties, nor should 
the law clerk employ such information for personal gain. 
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW CLERKS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Canon 3(C) (1989), quoted in Todd C. Peppers, Of Leakers and Legal Briefers: The Modern 
Supreme Court Law Clerk, 7 CHARLESTON L. REV. 95, 105 (2012).  Note that Judge Alex 
Kozinski in Conduct Unbecoming, a book review in the Yale Law Journal, has other language 
attributed to the Code of Conduct for Law Clerks of the Supreme Court of the United States.  
Alex Kozinski, Conduct Unbecoming, 108 YALE L.J. 835, 835–36 (1999) (reviewing EDWARD 
P. LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC 
STRUGGLE INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1998)). 
76.  408 U.S. 786 (1972). 
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When The Brethren came out, Justice Brennan was apparently 
apoplectic about what he thought was an intentional implication on our 
part that much of the book was based on his case histories and that he 
had been our major source.  Justice Brennan’s anger bubbled over when 
on 60 Minutes I tried to deflect Mike Wallace’s question about our 
sources and specifically whether Justice Brennan was our “Deep 
Throat.”77  I responded, “I think we’d rather not answer that,” an 
answer that “enraged Brennan, who thought it intentionally left the 
impression” he had in fact been our major source.78 
I meant nothing more than that we didn’t want to discuss sources in 
general.  But as described later, Justice Brennan took his greatest 
umbrage at our treatment of the case of Lyman Moore.  Moore had 
been sentenced to death for the shotgun murder of a bartender in 
Lansing, Illinois.  With the death penalty being struck down in another 
set of four cases, Justice Brennan felt he was accused of refusing to 
overturn Moore’s prison sentence even though he believed Moore was 
unfairly convicted.  He particularly resented The Brethren’s portrayal of 
his appeasing Justice Blackmun, who he “hoped to bring into line on 
[the] unrelated abortion and obscenity cases.”79 
What we had actually we said in the book was: 
Moore argued that he had been unfairly convicted.  The 
prosecution had withheld from the defense the fact that the three 
principal witnesses who claimed to have heard a “Slick” brag of 
the murder had all told police that they didn’t think this Moore 
was the same “Slick.”  A judge had also permitted prosecutors to 
wave a sawed-off shotgun in front of the jury, though the 
prosecution admitted at trial that it was not the murder weapon. 
At conference, the vote was 7 to 2 to uphold Moore’s 
conviction, with Marshall and Douglas the only dissenters.  
Moore would not get a new trial, but the death penalty decision 
in the other four cases would keep him from being executed. 
The Chief assigned the case to Blackmun. . . . 
When the opinion finally came around, it said the 
information, if withheld, did not prove Moore’s innocence, but 
only tended to show that he was not the same man who had 
 
77.  Wallace was referring to Woodward’s legendary, well-placed, and at that time 
undisclosed source during Watergate, as popularized by the movie version of All the 
President’s Men. 
78.  STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 37, at 461. 
79.  Id. (quoting Fred Barbash, Author’s View: No True Leader, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 
1979, at A1). 
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bragged about the murder.  Waving the shotgun before the jury, 
Blackmun stated, was not a sufficiently significant error to justify 
a new trial. 
Marshall was upset.  During his days of criminal-law practice, 
he had seen many men convicted by distorted presentations of 
the facts. . . . 
The identification by eyewitnesses had been crucial to 
obtaining the conviction and Blackmun was ignoring many of the 
facts damaging to their testimony.  This was a miscarriage of 
justice.  Marshall’s analysis was circulated as a dissent.  
Blackmun responded in a set of footnotes arguing his own 
version of the facts. 
Powell and Stewart quickly switched their votes, and 
Marshall needed only one more to take away Blackmun’s 
majority.  His friend Brennan would surely provide the fifth vote.  
Brennan, after all, was the author of a landmark 1963 decision 
(Brady v. Maryland)[80] that required prosecutors to turn over all 
exculpatory evidence to the defense. 
One of Brennan’s clerks thought that if Brennan had seen the 
facts as Marshall presented them, he would not have voted the 
other way.  He went to talk to Brennan and, thirty minutes later, 
returned shaken.  Brennan understood that Marshall’s position 
was correct, but he was not going to switch sides now, the clerk 
said.  This was not just a run-of-the-mill case for Blackmun.  
Blackmun had spent a lot of time on it, giving the trial record a 
close reading.  He prided himself on his objectivity.  If Brennan 
switched, Blackmun would be personally offended.  That would 
be unfortunate, because Blackmun had lately seemed more 
assertive, more independent of the Chief.  Brennan felt that if he 
voted against Blackmun now, it might make it more difficult to 
reach him in the abortion cases or even the obscenity cases. 
Sure, “Slick” Moore deserved a new trial.  But more likely 
than not, it would result in his being convicted again.  After all, 
Moore had a long record.  He was not exactly an angel.  Anyway, 
the Court could not concern itself with correcting every injustice.  
They should never have taken such a case, Brennan said.  He felt 
he had to consider the big picture. 
 
80.  We were incorrect about Justice Brennan’s role in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963).  He had not been the author.  In the second printing, we corrected this to say he “had 
been a moving force behind a whole series of cases that required prosecutors to turn over all 
exculpatory evidence to the defense.”  BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE 
BRETHREN 272 (paperback ed. 2005). 
 2014] CLERKS AS JUDICIAL ACTORS AND AS SOURCES 411 
“He won’t leave Harry on this,” Brennan’s clerk reported to 
Marshall’s clerk. 
The clerks were shocked that such considerations would keep 
a man in prison.  They wondered whether Brennan still would 
have refused to switch if the death penalty had not been struck. 
Marshall’s clerk asked his boss to talk to Brennan. 
Marshall refused.  It was not his style.  He resented pressure 
from the Chief and he was not about to imitate his methods.   
Marshall’s clerk made a final appeal through Brennan’s 
clerks. 
Brennan had his priorities.  His priority in this case was 
Harry Blackmun.  There would be no new trial for “Slick” 
Moore.81 
Justice Brennan’s fury presented itself two months later when a 
review of The Brethren appeared in The New York Review of Books.  
The scathing review was written by Anthony Lewis, a New York Times 
columnist and an experienced court watcher with extraordinary ties to 
Justice Brennan.82  Characterizing our treatment of Chief Justice Burger 
as “hit-and-run journalism,” Lewis said our account of the Moore case 
made “a serious charge [against Justice Brennan] without serious 
evidence” that  
[gave] the impression of relying on a conversation between 
Brennan and a law clerk that the law clerks of that term say 
never took place.  If the passage was not meant to rely on such a 
conversation with a clerk, then it grossly and deliberately 
misleads the reader.  In sum, the treatment of Moore v. Illinois 
leaves doubts not only about the authors’ understanding but 
about their scrupulousness.83 
Lewis corrected us on two points: Justice Brennan was not the author of 
the Brady opinion, Justice Douglas was, and the decision did not require 
 
81.  WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at 224–25. 
82.  Anthony Lewis, Supreme Court Confidential, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 7, 1980, at 3.  
Lewis also wrote two of the most influential books about the Supreme Court: Gideon’s 
Trumpet, which explicated the 1963 Supreme Court case Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
(1963), that guaranteed legal representation to poor defendants charged with serious crimes, 
and Make No Law, an account of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the 
1964 Supreme Court decision that revolutionized American libel law.  See generally 
ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (1964); ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE 
SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1991). 
83.  Lewis, supra note 82, at 4–5. 
 412 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:387 
evidence to be turned over unless it was “material to guilt or to 
punishment.”84 
Lewis found Paul Hoeber, the Brennan clerk who worked on Moore 
v. Illinois.  Hoeber told Lewis his account, which Lewis quoted: 
This is a case that was decided the last day of the term.  The 
feeling among Marshall’s clerks, Douglas’s, [Justice Lewis F.] 
Powell’s was that the case was being wrongly decided.  Right at 
the last minute—I think the day before—one of them came to 
me, and I think it was Marshall’s clerk.  He said to me, “Is there 
any chance of talking to Brennan and getting him to switch his 
vote?” 
. . .  I did talk to Brennan, and I said the view among us clerks 
is that Marshall is right.  Brennan’s response was, “No, I’ve read 
the opinions, it’s a factual case, and Blackmun is right.  As far as 
the law goes, there is nothing inconsistent with Brady. 
The conversation took two or three minutes.  And I wasn’t 
“shaken,” as the book says.  I told my co-clerks that Brennan was 
firm, I told Marshall’s and I told Powell’s.  That is all that 
happened. 
I can just tell you that there was no such conversation.85 
Lewis went on to say that  
Hoeber was sufficiently outraged when he read The Brethren 
that he telephoned the three other men who had clerked for 
Justice Brennan in the 1971–1972 term.  All agreed that they had 
had no such conversation with the Justice.  The idea that Justice 
Brennan had acknowledged to one of his clerks the correctness 
of the dissent in Moore was, to them, simply false.86 
Lewis cited a conversation that Hoeber had with Woodward 
complaining that “none of the four clerks of that term had such a 
conversation with Justice Brennan.”87  Hoeber said Woodward’s 
response was that there were other sources.  Hoeber told Lewis that he 
and the other three Brennan clerks called twenty-nine of the thirty 
clerks that Term, and “[n]one knew anything about clerks having been 
‘shaken’ or ‘shocked.’”88 
 
84.  Id. at 3. 
85.  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Paul R. Hoeber). 
86.  Id. 
87.  Id. 
88.  Id. 
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The remainder of Lewis’s review takes exception with the notion 
that we found the Supreme Court worthy of such detailed inquiry and 
included what Justice and clerks said in moments of candor.  Reports of 
the feelings expressed inside the Court, were, to Lewis, “not news.”89 
We were surprised by the tone of the review, although other 
defenders of the Court and its Justices had made some similar 
objections without alleging errors.  The discussion of the Moore case 
was most surprising for two other reasons.  First of all, with the 
exception of Justice Brennan’s articulated motivation for not shifting his 
vote, Hoeber had confirmed the basic details of the case including 
raising the issue with Justice Brennan, who refused to change, and then 
telling this to his co-clerks and to clerks from at least three other 
chambers.  So the only real question raised was, what was conveyed in 
those conversations? 
The second shocking thing was that the two interviews with Hoeber 
had been on the record, making him one of only two clerks who spoke 
on the record. 
I was particularly struck because at the time I read Woodward’s 
memo about his first interview with Hoeber, I was writing our first draft 
treatment of the capital punishment cases and had paid insufficient 
attention to the Moore case as a cast off remainder.  Woodward’s notes 
said: 
Another case involving a guy named Slick; believe case was 
Moore v. Illinois.  It was a Blackmun opinion and Bren. joined it.  
Decision was clearly wrong but Bren. did not want take back his 
vote.  It had started out as 7 to 2; Pow. [Justice Lewis Powell] and 
one other switched after more study as any logical person would 
have done.  So it was 5 to 4.  Bren. held to original position 
because it was Blackmun.  Clerks blamed themselves for not 
getting on the case early and seeing what it involved.  Marsh. 
[Marshall] dissented.90 
Armed with Hoeber’s cryptic account of the case, I joined 
Woodward in interviewing other clerks and sources.  In all we had six 
sources in addition to Hoeber who confirmed or offered additional 
detail.  Two of those other sources had spoken directly to Justice 
Brennan.  
 
89.  Id. 
90.  Scott Armstrong & Bob Woodward, The Evidence of ‘The Brethren’: An Exchange, 
N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 12, 1980, at 47, 48. 
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So when Lewis’s review was published, I was absolutely sure we had 
accurately captured the Brennan conversation with Hoeber and what 
Hoeber had told others.  One of the sources who spoke directly to 
Justice Brennan had spoken to other Justices as well and had been given 
the same rationale as we quote Justice Brennan giving Hoeber; all of 
our sources said at the time they were either “surprised” or “shocked,” 
and two reported Hoeber as “shaken.”  In addition, when Hoeber and 
his three co-clerks sent a letter to the Post disputing the account of the 
Moore case, we had contacted Hoeber and read him the notes of his 
interview.  One half hour later, a messenger arrived withdrawing the 
letter on Hoeber’s behalf.91 
We wrote a strong response to Lewis in The New York Review of 
Books,92 which referenced the details of our interviews and that the 
Brennan clerks had withdrawn their letter.  We asked whether it was 
more 
likely that Hoeber’s new position is accurate after the 
publication of a book that contains criticisms of his former boss?  
Or is it more likely that Hoeber was accurate in 1972 when he 
reported Brennan’s reaction to others at the Court and in 1977 
when he gave the same account to us?  It seems far more likely 
to us that Hoeber’s memory and candor were operating more 
precisely before there was a public controversy about the case, 
than after.93 
Lewis responded in The New York Review of Books with more 
inconclusive information from clerks admitting to having spoken to us 
about the case but denying there were sources for the account of Justice 
Brennan’s motives.  He does acknowledge that, upon re-interviewing 
them, the Brennan clerks admitted withdrawing their letter.94 
The dialogue was left to die there.95  But we got a bit more of the 
context when the well-documented biography of Justice Brennan—
 
91.  I don’t have access to our files, but I believe the other clerks also withdrew from the 
letter. 
92.  Armstrong & Woodward, supra note 90, at 47. 
93.  Id. at 48. 
94.  Anthony Lewis, Anthony Lewis Replies, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 12, 1980, at 48. 
95.  It was over twenty years later before Lewis privately acknowledged to me that our 
account of the case was likely correct.  The papers of other Justices had by that time 
confirmed our story, as well as others that Justice Brennan had told Lewis were untrue.  
Justice Brennan’s animosity towards The Brethren apparently reflected a deep animosity 
toward the press, which belied the important role he has played in upholding other free press 
and free speech values. 
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Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion, by Seth Stern and Stephen 
Wermeil96—came out.  In it, the authors noted: “Brennan certainly did 
not mind when his clerks and a friendly journalist sought to challenge 
the book’s most damaging charge against him: that he switched votes to 
curry favor with Blackmun.”97  The book cites the clerks’ letter without 
noting that they withdrew it.  “‘I can’t adequately tell you how much 
your response means to me,’ Brennan wrote Lewis.”98  The book 
contains many stories which confirm our treatment of cases but shows 
just how thin-skinned Justice Brennan was about his treatment by the 
press. 
On reflection, I began to wonder what other details might be 
available in recently released Justices’ files that would explain what 
happened as well as why Justice Brennan and his clerks were so upset.  
What I found would not change our account of the Moore case aside 
from a few details, but it would put it in a larger context which we may 
have failed to emphasize sufficiently. 
The most difficult task in long narratives about complex, interlocked 
sequences of events is to tell the constantly overlapping details in 
coherent chronologies, without constantly repeating details in a 
cumbersome way that would annoy and distract readers.  On re-reading 
The Brethren recently, I recognized some of the shortcomings of our 
efforts.  Because of the order in which we present our accounts of the 
case groupings—particularly our treatment of the abortion cases and 
the decision to hold them over to the next Term—the reader is deprived 
of a sense of the full depth of intrigue in the interplay between chambers 
in the second half of the 1971 Term. 
The 1971 Term represents one of the most dramatic transitions in 
the Court’s history.  Justices Black and Harlan departed in September 
1971.  With the delays in replacing them caused by the failure of the 
Carwell and Haynesworth nominations, the arrival of Justices Powell 
and Rehnquist in January 1972 accelerated the shift from the liberal 
orientation of the Warren Court to a more conservative and more 
deeply divided Burger Court.  The two new members had missed 
October through December oral arguments, covering roughly half the 
court’s workload. 
 
96.  STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 37. 
97.  Id. at 468.  Actually, the book said he refused to switch votes, although as the 
account below notes, it may be accurate to say he had already switched votes and refused to 
switch back. 
98.  Id. at 469. 
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With the availability of Justice Powell’s digitalized case files online99 
and the selected availability of certain of Justices Douglas’s, Marshall’s, 
and Blackmun’s files in digitized form online,100 it is now possible to see 
the timing of some of these events with more precision than we could 
muster from the records and accounts we gathered from multiple 
sources as we worked. 
The history preceding the Blackmun circulation in Moore, as well as 
the timing of the circulation, shed further light on the dynamic that was 
going on within the Court. 
When Justices Powell and Rehnquist came on the Court, Justices 
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall and even Justice Potter Stewart began 
to worry about the appointment of four Justices by Nixon.101  Chief 
Justice Burger already had one “twin,” since Justice Blackmun had 
shown very little independence to date.  Now, two more appointments 
would likely make a solid lock.102  They were aware that Chief Justice 
Burger sent “eyes only” memos to the two new Justices.103 
After oral argument in the two abortion cases, Chief Justice Burger 
assigned them to Justice Blackmun.  On December 18, 1971, Justice 
Douglas objected in a memo to Chief Justice Burger with copies to all 
the members of the conference: 
As respects your assignment in this Case [Doe v. Bolton], my 
notes show there were four votes to hold parts of the Georgia 
Act unconstitutional and to remand for further findings, e.g., on 
equal protection.  Those four were Bill Brennan, Potter Stewart, 
Thurgood Marshall and me. 
There were three to sustain the law as written—you, Byron 
White, and Harry Blackmun. 
 
99.  POWELL PAPERS, supra note 57. 
100.  PAUL J. WAHLBECK, JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & FORREST MALTZMAN, THE 
BURGER COURT OPINION-WRITING DATABASE (2011) [hereinafter WAHLBECK, ET AL., 
OPINION-WRITING DATABASE], http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/, archived at http://pe
rma.cc/3E4Z-R7LN.  To give the fullest explanation, it would be necessary to gather and 
digitalize the files of these four Justices.  In addition, Justice Brennan’s files are available for 
authorized uses, which will shed further light.  Justices Stewart and White’s recently unsealed 
files will also help complete the picture. 
101.  There had been no similarly high number of Justices appointed since the Roosevelt 
administration, and never had four Justices been appointed within the first three years of a 
president’s term. 
102.  See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at 172–73, 222. 
103.  For example, in January 1972, the Chief Justice privately took Justice Powell aside 
to give him an opinion by Justice Douglas that had never been published but that conflicted 
with his current position on the death penalty cases in an effort to undermine Justice 
Douglas’s credibility with Justice Powell. 
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I would think, therefore, that to save future time and trouble, 
one of the four, rather than one of the three, should write the 
opinion.104 
Chief Justice Burger responded to Justice Douglas on December 20th: 
At the close of discussion of this case, I remarked to the 
Conference that there were, literally, not enough columns to 
mark up an accurate reflection of the voting in either the 
Georgia or the Texas cases.  I therefore marked down no votes 
and said this was a case that would have to stand or fall on the 
writing, when it was done. 
That is still my view of how to handle these two (also No.70-
18—Roe v. Wade) sensitive cases, which, I might add, are quite 
probable candidates for reargument. 
However, I have no desire to restrain anyone’s writing even 
though I do not have the same impression of views.105 
Justice Douglas feared that Chief Justice Burger was also anxious to 
delay cases until Justices Powell and Rehnquist could vote on them.  On 
January 18th, in response to an invitation by Chief Justice Burger to the 
Justices to designate cases which should be reargued, Justice Blackmun 
suggested that it might be best to have Roe and Doe reargued the next 
 
104.  Memorandum from William O. Douglas, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (Dec. 
18, 1971), in The Burger Court Opinion Writing Database: Doe v. Bolton [hereinafter Opinion 
Writing Database: Doe v. Bolton], http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1
971/70-40.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3BKP-FAD2, in WAHLBECK, ET AL., 
OPINION-WRITING DATABASE, supra note 100.  Also note that according to the conference 
notes of Justices now available, Justice Blackmun either voted to strike both statutes or to 
strike only the Texas law.  Justice Douglas’s notes have four Justices—Douglas, Brennan, 
Stewart, and Marshall—voting to strike both statutes.  See Douglas B1589.  Justice Brennan’s 
notes have a 5–2 split in both cases.  See Brennan B420b.  Justice Brennan’s notes also reflect 
that both Justices Douglas and Blackmun “seemed to favor remanding the [Doe] case” to get 
a “richer and more detailed record.”  See DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: 
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 532 (1994).  Garrow reports 
that, according to Justice Douglas’s clerks, after the conference on the cases, the Court’s 
senior member “was in an especially good mood, for he had been very pleasantly surprised by 
Harry Blackmun’s comments about both Roe and Doe.”  Id.  Because of this, even though he 
had initially considered Justice Potter Stewart for authorship of the opinions, he was now 
inclined to assign them to Justice Blackmun.  Id. at 533, cited in Joseph F. Kobylka, Tales 
from the Blackmun Papers: A Fuller Appreciation of Harry Blackmun’s Judicial Legacy, 70 
MO. L. REV. 1075, 1085 n.73 (2005), http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?a
rticle=3676&context=mlr, archived at http://perma.cc/4GPV-ACFZ. 
105.  Memorandum from Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United 
States, to William O. Douglas, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (Dec. 
20, 1971), in Opinion Writing Database: Doe v. Bolton, supra note 104. 
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Term.106  From Justice Douglas’s perspective, should the cases be 
reargued with the two new Nixon appointees voting, a majority for a 
privacy right which would strike the abortion laws could turn into a 5–4 
decision supporting continued state regulation. 
On March 6, 1972, Justice Douglas again challenged Chief Justice 
Burger’s assignment practices in a polite but direct memo to the Chief 
regarding an unauthorized wiretapping case, in which he questioned the 
Chief having assigned the case when in fact Justice Douglas was the 
senior Justice who favored the majority view: 
I think the assignment to Byron (much as I love my friend) is 
not an appropriate one for the reason that he and two others 
including yourself voted to affirm on the statute, while there 
were five who voted to affirm on the Constitution.  Those five 
were Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, myself, and Powell. 
You will recall that Lewis Powell said that to handle the 
government’s problem of searching the country over for an 
appropriate magistrate to issue a warrant, an opinion should be 
written suggesting that the court here in the District of Columbia 
should handle all of the cases, which I thought was a splendid 
idea. 
With all respect, I think Powell represents the consensus. 
I have not canvassed everybody, but I am sure that Byron, 
who goes on the statute, will not get a court. 
To save time, may I suggest you have a huddle and see to it 
that Powell gets the opinion to write? 
Or if you want me to suggest an assignment, that would be 
mine.107 
 
106.  Memorandum from Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (Jan. 
18, 1972), in 70-18 Roe v. Wade, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/70-
18_RoeWade.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/C6CK-VXUJ, in POWELL PAPERS, supra note 
57; see WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at 170. 
107.  Memorandum from William O. Douglas, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (Mar. 
6, 1972), in 70-153 U.S. v. U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern 
Division [hereinafter U.S. v. U.S. District Court: Mar.−Apr. 1972], 1972 March−April, 
http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/70-153_U.S.%20v.%20U.S.%20District%
20Court,%201972March-April.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9N8U-MCBC, in POWELL 
PAPERS, supra note 57.  Justice Douglas also objected to assignments in Gooding v. Wilson, 
insisting that Justice White had voted with a five person majority along with Justice Douglas.  
Justice White said he had not voted that way, and the issue was dropped.  See WOODWARD & 
ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at 177.  We also describe the case of Lloyd v. Tanner, in which 
Justice Douglas insisted that because the Chief was unsure of his position, he was the senior 
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That same day, Chief Justice Burger responded to Justice Douglas’s 
challenge by politely rebuffing his suggestion: 
I have your memo of March 6 and see no reason why Lewis 
should not undertake to write and see what support his position 
achieves.  I am not as clear on Lewis’ position as your memo 
suggests but I would be happy if his view could command a 
majority. 
I believe there may be much likelihood of Byron’s securing 
substantial support and I am not sure Byron’s and Lewis’ views 
are not rather close. 
In all events this, like several other of our current cases, will 
not clarify until we have something in writing. 
I adhere to my request that Byron proceed to write.  We 
cannot evaluate the views until we see them.  They may not 
“write” as they were expressed at Conference and of necessity 
few were very precise—or could be.108 
Justice Douglas responded two days later by addressing the question 
directly to Justice Powell but copying only Justice Brennan: 
The vote at Conference was to affirm but there were five of 
us who could not do it on the statute but went on the 
Constitution.  And according to my notes, you were one of the 
five.  Byron, however, was explicit.  He could not go on the 
Constitution but would have to go on the statute. 
Traditionally an opinion would therefore be in the province 
of the senior Justice to assign.  That was not done in this case and 
the matter is of no consequence to me as a matter of pride and 
privilege—but I think it makes a tremendous difference in the 
result. 
I am writing you this note hoping you will put on paper the 
ideas you expressed in Conference and I am sure you will get a 
majority.  I gather from the Chief’s memo that he is not at all 
averse to that being done.109 
After examining the records in the case, Justice Powell delicately 
demurred the next day: 
 
Justice in a 4–4 vote and wanted to assign Justice Thurgood Marshall.  Id. at 178–81. 
108.  Memorandum from Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United 
States, to William O. Douglas, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (Mar. 6, 
1972), in U.S. v. U.S. District Court: Mar.−Apr. 1972, supra note 107. 
109.  Memorandum from William O. Douglas, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States 
(Mar. 8, 1972), in U.S. v. U.S. District Court: Mar.−Apr. 1972, supra note 107. 
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In view of the exchange of notes as to how we proceed with 
the opinion writing in the above case, I thought it might be well 
for me to outline my present thinking on this case.  I have no 
very clear idea as to whether the substance of these views is 
shared by other members of the Court.  I suspect each of us 
differs in certain respects. 
Byron (to whom I am sending a copy of the memorandum) is 
clearly better qualified than I am to write, and I assume that he 
will do so.  But I will undertake to enlarge this memorandum 
into a draft if this seems desirable.110 
Justice Powell set about writing an opinion which would become the 
majority view.  But in the context of Chief Justice Burger’s strong 
objections, Justice Powell wrote him a “personal” note suggesting that if 
the Court did not go along with setting a Constitutional standard, the 
case would come right back to them again in some other guise.111  The 
other votes fell into place as joins and concurrences and a join only in 
the result from the Chief.  Justice Blackmun remained silent until June 
12th, when he joined Justice Powell’s opinion. 
On April 21st, Justice Douglas assigned to Justice Marshall an 
important case, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,112 involving the free speech 
rights of antiwar demonstrators who had distributed literature in a 
private retail mall, noting the vote had been 5–4 with Justice Douglas 
the most senior in the majority.113  On the 24th, Chief Justice Burger 
responded with a head-on challenge: 
 
110.  Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, and 
William O. Douglas, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (Mar. 9, 1972), in 
U.S. v. U.S. District Court: Mar.−Apr. 1972, supra note 107. 
111.  Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (May 
3, 1972), in The Burger Court Opinion Writing Database: United States v. United States District 
Court for Eastern District of Michigan, http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_p
dfs/1971/70-153.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/H57X-TGCE, in WAHLBECK, ET AL., 
OPINION-WRITING DATABASE, supra note 100. 
112.  Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). 
113.  Memorandum from William O. Douglas, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (Apr. 
21, 1972), in The Burger Court Opinion Writing Database: Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner [hereinafter 
Opinion Writing Database: Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner], http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/fil
es/opinion_pdfs/1971/71-492.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5N2E-UKCP, in WAHLBECK, ET 
AL., OPINION-WRITING DATABASE, supra note 100; see WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra 
note 1, at 178–81. 
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The vote was not 5–4 as I had reserved and not voted at all. 
Independent of what Harry does I will assign this case in due 
course if I vote to affirm.  With a Federal Judicial Center 
meeting Saturday and part of Sunday I have not as yet worked 
on the assignments of our final cases.  If I am not in the majority, 
you will, of course, then be free to assign.114 
That same day, Justice Blackmun diplomatically wrote Justice Marshall: 
I note Justice Douglas’ assignment of the opinion in this case 
to you.  Please bear in mind that my vote at Conference was very 
tentative.  I am not at all at rest and at the moment could go 
either way.  I mention this because of the closeness of the vote.115 
On April 25th, Justice Powell responded diplomatically to a request 
from Justice White, the senior member of the court who had voted for 
the other side of the Tanner case from Justice Douglas’s: 
This is to confirm that I will be glad, as you requested, to 
draft an opinion for those of us who voted to reverse the above 
case. 
I note that Harry’s vote is still tentative and my notes 
indicate that the Chief reserved decision.  Thus, unless advised to 
the contrary, I will assume that you, Bill Rehnquist and I are the 
only solid votes on our side at this time.116 
On May 1st, Justice Douglas responded to Chief Justice Burger with his 
own challenge: 
You apparently misunderstand.  Lloyd is already assigned to 
Thurgood and he’s at work on an opinion.  Whether he will 
command a majority, no one knows. 
Under the Constitution & Acts of Congress, there are no 
provisions for assignment of opinions.  Historically, the Chief 
Justice has made the assignment if he is in the majority.  
Historically, the senior in the majority assigns the opinion if the 
Chief Justice is in the minority. 
 
114.  Memorandum from Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United 
States, to William O. Douglas, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (Apr. 
24, 1972), in Opinion Writing Database: Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, supra note 113. 
115.  Memorandum from Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to Thurgood Marshall, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States 
(Apr. 24, 1972), in Opinion Writing Database: Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, supra note 113. 
116.  Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to Byron R. White, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States 
(Apr. 25, 1972) (emphasis added), in Opinion Writing Database: Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, supra 
note 113. 
 422 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:387 
You led the Conference battle against affirmance and that is 
your privilege.  But it is also the privilege of the majority, absent 
the Chief Justice, to make the assignment.  Hence, Lloyd was 
assigned and is assigned.117 
Making reference to a bussing case from the previous Term, Justice 
Douglas continued: 
The tragedy of compromising on this simple procedure is 
illustrated by last Term’s Swann.  You who were a minority of 
two kept the opinion for yourself and faithfully wrote the 
minority position which the majority could not accept.  Potter 
wrote the majority view and a majority agreed to it.  It was not 
circulated because we thought you should see it.  After much 
effort your minority opinion was transformed, the majority view 
prevailed, and the result was unanimous. 
But Swann illustrated the wasted time and effort and the 
frayed relations which result when the traditional assignment 
procedure is not followed. 
If the Conference wants to authorize you to assign all 
opinions, that will be a new procedure.  Though opposed to it, I 
will acquiesce.  But unless we make a frank reversal in our policy, 
any group in the majority should and must make the 
assignment.118 
Justice Douglas imputed the worst motives to Chief Justice Burger: 
This is a two-edge sword.  Byron might well head up five 
members of the Court, you, Bill Brennan, Potter Stewart and I 
being the minority; and we might feel very strongly about it.  But 
in that event it is for Byron to make the assignment.  It is not for 
us in the minority to try to outwit Byron by saying “I reserve my 
vote” and then recast it to control the assignment.  That only leads 
to a frayed and bitter Court full of needless strains and quarrels. 
Lloyd stays assigned to Thurgood.119 
On May 8th, the tension rose again, when Chief Justice Burger 
informed the conference that he continued “to find the case a very 
 
117.  Memorandum from William O. Douglas, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (May. 
1, 1972), in Opinion Writing Database: Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, supra note 113. 
118.  Id. (emphasis added). 
119.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 2014] CLERKS AS JUDICIAL ACTORS AND AS SOURCES 423 
difficult one” but “concluded to vote to reverse the judgment under 
review” and was assigning the case to Powell.120 
Under pressure from the Chief Justice, Justice Blackmun wrote later 
that day: “Dear Chief: I have spent a good bit of the weekend wrestling 
with this case.  I have now concluded that my vote will be to reverse and 
not extend Logan Valley to the present situation.”121  Justice Blackmun’s 
shift after the Chief Justice’s declaration took the majority away from 
the Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall coalition.  The shift gave 
Justice Powell a majority before he had even circulated a draft opinion.  
Most of all, it cemented the view of the Douglas coalition that Justice 
Blackmun could well shift his position in cases important to Chief 
Justice Burger. 
On May 18th, Justice Blackmun circulated his “first and tentative 
draft” opinion in Roe v. Wade holding that the Texas statute was 
unconstitutionally vague, which in effect would invalidate the abortion 
laws in a majority of states.122 
Justice Brennan endorsed the draft the same day but sent his 
comments to Justice Blackmun with suggestions for the other abortion 
case: 
My recollection of the voting on this and the Georgia case 
was that a majority of us felt that the Constitution required the 
invalidation of abortion statutes save to the extent they required 
that an abortion be performed by a licensed physician within 
some limited time after conception.  I think essentially this was 
the view shared by Bill, Potter, Thurgood and me.  My notes also 
indicate that you might support this view at least in this Texas 
case.  In the circumstances, I would prefer a disposition of the 
core constitutional question.  Your circulation, however, 
invalidates the Texas statute only on the vagueness ground.  I see 
no reason for a reargument in the Georgia case.  I think we 
 
120.  Memorandum from Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United 
States, to the Conference (May 8, 1972), in Opinion Writing Database: Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 
supra note 113. 
121.  Memorandum from Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (May 
8, 1972), in Opinion Writing Database: Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, supra note 113. 
122.  Memorandum from Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to Conference (May 18, 1972), in The Burger Court Opinion Writing Database: 
Roe v. Wade [hereinafter Opinion Writing Database: Roe v. Wade], http://supremecourtopinio
ns.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1971/70-18.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/J565-UPKM, in 
WAHLBECK, ET AL., OPINION-WRITING DATABASE, supra note 100. 
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should dispose of both cases on the ground supported by the 
majority. 
This does not mean, however, that I disagree with your 
conclusion as to the vagueness of the Texas statute.  I only feel 
that there is no point in delaying longer our confrontation with 
the core issue on which there appears to be a majority and which 
would make reaching the vagueness issue unnecessary.123 
Justices Douglas and Marshall indicated a week later their assent to the 
Roe case. 
On May 25th, Justice Blackmun circulated his draft of Doe v. Bolton, 
striking down the Georgia law and upholding only abortions performed 
in a licensed hospital by a licensed physician “based upon his best 
clinical judgment . . . an abortion is necessary.”124  The draft opinion in 
Bolton was considerably more substantive than the Roe draft.  The 
opinion balanced the State’s interest in preserving life with the right of a 
woman and her doctor to control her body.  It did not go all the way to 
establishing a constitutionally based right of privacy, but it was close 
enough that Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall immediately 
joined. 
Chief Justice Burger once again pushed for a reargument of the 
abortion cases.  On Saturday, May 27th, he went to Justice Blackmun’s 
chambers and met privately with Justice Blackmun for hours.  Justice 
Blackmun’s clerks waited anxiously to find out what cases the Chief was 
discussing with Justice Blackmun, but the Justice left the office without 
a word to them.125 
 
123.  Memorandum from William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice, Supreme Court of 
the United States, to Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United 
States (May 18, 1972), in Opinion Writing Database: Roe v. Wade, supra note 122. 
124.  Harry A. Blackmun, Doe v. Bolton (May 25, 1972) (circulated draft) (quoting Act 
of Apr. 10, 1968, No. 1157, sec. 1, § 26-1202(a), 1968 Ga. Laws 1249, 1277) (internal quotation 
marks omitted), as available in Opinion Writing Database: Roe v. Wade, supra note 122. 
125.  WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at 186.  The clerks speculated that 
there was a connection between Chief Justice Burger’s providing Justice Blackmun with a 
fifth vote for Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion in Flood v. Kuhn and Justice Blackmun’s 
willingness to put over the abortion case for reargument.  At the time of the conference, 
Justice Marshall had voted with Justice Blackmun in favor of major league baseball and Chief 
Justice Burger for Flood.  See id. at 190.  Once Justice Marshall switched to a dissent, Justice 
Blackmun, still lacking the Chief’s vote, did not yet have a majority.  He had only himself and 
Justices Stewart, White, and Rehnquist.  Id. at 190–91.  Justice Powell, who favored Flood, 
insisted on recusing himself for a conflict of interest despite his clerks’ unsuccessful last-
minute effort to get him into the case, since holding stock in Budweiser (the owner of the St. 
Louis Cardinals) would not be seen as a conflict if he voted against Major League Baseball.  
Id. at 191–92.  For a very well-researched book that relies on several Justices’ papers, see also 
BRAD SNYDER, A WELL-PAID SLAVE: CURT FLOOD’S FIGHT FOR FREE AGENCY IN 
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On Monday morning, May 29th, Justice White circulated a strong 
dissent in the abortion cases, but Justice Stewart called Justice 
Blackmun indicating he too would join if accommodated on a couple of 
points.  Justice Blackmun now had a 5–2 majority.  Even if Justices 
Powell and Rehnquist had sided with Chief Justice Burger and Justice 
White against striking down the abortion statutes, there would have 
been a five man majority to strike them down. 
Despite his five-man majority striking down the Texas and Georgia 
abortion statues, on May 31st Blackmun waivered once again.  He wrote 
the conference indicating his belief that “on an issue so sensitive and so 
emotional as this one, the country deserves the conclusion of a nine-
man, not a seven-man court, whatever the ultimate decision may be.”126 
Justice Blackmun also said, “Although I have worked on these cases 
with some concentration, I am not yet certain about all the details.”127 
 
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 283–304 (2006) (citing Douglas B1561/F71-32(d); Blackmun B60/F9; 
id. at B145/F2–3; id. at B1403/F4–5; Brennan BI:253/F8; 1971 Case History, Brennan BII-
6/F14–15; Marshall B87/F10; Powell B148/F3). 
The Brethren’s handling of Flood v. Kuhn has also been challenged, including by Ross 
Davies, who notes that Justice Blackmun denied our story that, after being called to task by 
Justice Marshall for not having any black players on his original list of greats, he added 
three—Satchel Paige, Jackie Robinson, and Roy Campanella.  Ross E. Davies, A Tall Tale of 
The Brethren, 33 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 186, 190 (2008).  The issue of whether we erred is whether 
Justice Marshall’s chiding of Justice Blackmun was based on his failure to include the names 
of blacks in his first circulation of a “published” draft of the opinion.  Professor Davies has 
located what he characterizes as Justice Blackmun’s first draft, which includes the names of 
the black players.  I have not had time to track down our files.  While we could be wrong on 
this detail, I suspect that the list Justice Marshall was using to chide Justice Blackmun was 
from a chambers draft, a working typescript shared among clerks prior to the first formal 
published draft.  For a discussion of Justice Powell’s use of such drafts in the Snepp case, see 
supra notes 56–68 and accompanying text.  But our account did not imply that Justice 
Marshall was using the names to bargain.  He was simply chiding Justice Blackmun for not 
understanding that blacks had been excluded from the major leagues until 1947.  It may be 
noteworthy that without the names of the three black players, the careers of those on the 
roster predate 1945.  (This supports the theory that the list that Justice Marshall saw was in 
typescript form at a stage when the only names on the list predated 1945.  This may also 
account for Justice Blackmun’s exclusion of Camillo Pascual.  See WOODWARD & 
ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at 190–91.)  It is also clear from Justice Marshall’s dissent that his 
differences with Justice Blackmun were substantive on both the issue of stare decisis and the 
uniquely weakened position of labor representation for players as a result of the Court’s 
deference to Major League Baseball. 
126.  Memorandum from Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to the Conference (May 31, 1972), in Opinion Writing Database: Roe v. Wade, 
supra note 122. 
127.  Id. at 2.  In The Brethren, we had this happening on June 3rd, WOODWARD & 
ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at 186, but Justice Powell’s files indicate otherwise. 
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Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart and Marshall were concerned 
that the Chief Justice was pressuring Justice Blackmun and that after 
the break before next Term’s reargument Justice Blackmun might 
abandon the majority stance on the constitutional merits.128  All three 
immediately weighed in against reargument.  Justice Brennan tried to 
change Justice Blackmun’s mind, saying, “I see no reason to put these 
cases over for reargument,” particularly since “there are five of us (Bill 
Douglas, Potter, Thurgood, you and I) in substantial agreement with 
both opinions and in that circumstance I question that reargument 
would change things.”129  Justice Douglas was even stronger: 
While we could sit around and make pages of suggestions, I 
really don’t think that is important.  The important thing is to get 
them down. 
In the second place, I have a feeling that where the Court is 
split 4–4 or 4–2–1 or even in an important constitutional case 4–
3, reargument may be desirable.  But you have a firm 5 and the 
firm 5 will be behind you in these two opinions until they come 
down.  It is a difficult field and a difficult subject.  But where 
there is that solid agreement of the majority I think it is 
important to announce the cases, and let the result be known so 
that the legislatures can go to work and draft their new laws.130 
The next day, June 1st, Justice Powell, who had not participated in 
the case, circulated his first comment on the matter to the conference, 
indicating his preference for reargument: 
I have not read the briefs; nor have I read either of Harry’s 
opinions.  I am too concerned about circulating my own 
remaining opinions to be studying cases in which I did not 
participate.  I certainly do not know how I would vote if the cases 
are reargued. 
In any event, I have concluded that it is appropriate for me to 
participate in the pending question.  I have read the memoranda 
circulated, and am persuaded to favor reargument primarily by 
the fact that Harry Blackmun, the author of the opinions, thinks 
the cases should be carried over and reargued next fall.  His 
 
128.  WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at 186–87. 
129.  Memorandum from William J. Brennan, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States 
(May 31, 1972), in Opinion Writing Database: Roe v. Wade, supra note 122. 
130.  Memorandum from William O. Douglas, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States 
(May 31, 1972), in 70-18 Roe v. Wade, supra note 106. 
 2014] CLERKS AS JUDICIAL ACTORS AND AS SOURCES 427 
position, based on months of study, suggests enough doubt on an 
issue of large national importance to justify the few months 
delay.131 
Justice Rehnquist chimed in for reargument, creating a majority for 
reargument. 
The same day, Justice Douglas wrote Chief Justice Burger with 
copies to the rest of the Court stating that if the vote of the Conference 
was to reargue, he would “file a statement telling what is happening to 
us and the tragedy it entails.”132 
He sent to Justice Brennan alone his draft memorandum which 
complained that Chief Justice Burger had usurped the assignment of the 
case although the Chief was in a minority of three of the seven eligible 
to vote.133  The political accusation was now being threatened as a public 
circulation: 
The Chief Justice represented the minority view in the 
Conference and forcefully urged his viewpoint on the issues.  It 
was a seven-man Court that heard these cases and voted on 
them.  Out of that seven there were four who initially took a 
majority view.  Hence traditionally the senior Justice in the 
majority should have made the assignment of the opinion.  The 
cases were, however, assigned by the Chief Justice, an action no 
Chief Justice in my time would ever have taken.  For the tradition 
is a longstanding one that the senior Justice in the majority 
makes the assignment. 
The matter of assignment is not merely a matter of protocol.  
The main function of the Conference is to find the consensus.  
When that is known, it is only logical that the majority decide 
who their spokesman should be; and traditionally the selection 
has been made after a very informal discussion among the 
majority. 
When that procedure is followed, the majority view is 
promptly written out and circulated, after which dissents or 
concurrences may be prepared. 
When, however, the minority seeks to control the assignment, 
there is a destructive force at work in the Court.  When the Chief 
 
131.  Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to the Conference (June 1, 1972), in 70-18 Roe v. Wade, supra note 106. 
132.  Memorandum from William O. Douglas, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (June 
1, 1972), in 70-18 Roe v. Wade, supra note 106. 
133.  Justices Powell and Rehnquist had not been on the Court when the case was 
originally argued and had not participated in the decision. 
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Justice tries to bend the Court to his will by manipulating 
assignments, the integrity of the institution is imperiled. 
. . . . 
Perhaps the purpose of The Chief Justice, a member of the 
minority in the Abortion Cases, in assigning the opinions was to 
try to keep control of the merits.  If that was the aim, he was 
unsuccessful.  Opinions in these two cases have been circulated 
and each commands the votes of five members of the Court.  
Those votes are firm, the Justices having spent many, many 
hours since last October mulling over every detail of the cases.  
The cases should therefore be announced. 
The plea that the cases be reargued is merely another strategy 
by a minority somehow to suppress the majority view with the 
hope that exigencies of time will change the result.  That might be 
achieved of course by death or conceivably retirement.  But that 
kind of strategy dilutes the integrity of the Court and makes the 
decisions here depend on the manipulative skills of a Chief Justice. 
The Abortion Cases are symptomatic.  This is an election 
year.  Both political parties have made abortion an issue.  What 
the parties say or do is none of our business.  We sit here not to 
make the path of any candidate easier or more difficult.  We 
decide questions only on their constitutional merits.  To prolong 
these Abortion Cases into the next election would in the eyes of 
many be a political gesture unworthy of the Court. 
Each of us is sovereign in his own right.  Each arrived on his 
own.  Each is beholden to no one.  Russia once gave its Chief 
Justice two votes; but that was too strong even for the Russians. . . . 
Five members of the Court have agreed on a disposition of 
the Texas and Georgia Abortion Cases.  One dissent has already 
been written.  Those opinions should come down forthwith.134 
Justice Brennan, fearing the damage that would be done to the 
Court by the ferocity and specificity of the attack, urged Justice Douglas 
to soften the language and bracketed phrases he felt would be the most 
damaging.  Justice Douglas removed several of the most offensive 
references.135  But Justice Douglas refused to remove the rest, and on 
 
134.  WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at 187–88 (emphasis added); see 
William O. Douglas, First Draft of Dissent to Order for Reargument in Roe v. Wade and Doe 
v. Bolton (June 2, 1972), as quoted in JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER 
STRUGGLE INSIDE THE REHNQUIST COURT 102–03 (1st Touchstone ed. 1996); see also 
William O. Douglas, Sixth Draft of Dissent to Order for Reargument in Roe v. Wade and 
Doe v. Bolton (June 13, 1972), in Opinion Writing Database: Roe v. Wade, supra note 122. 
135.  SIMON, supra note 134, at 103–04.  These included the references to the Russian 
Chief Justice having two votes, the statement that “[w]hen the Chief Justice tries to bend the 
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June 13th, Douglas circulated to everyone in the conference his sixth 
draft, now styled as a dissent, and left for Goose Prairie.136 
Justice Blackmun was bothered by the looming confrontation.137  
Justice Douglas’s threat to expose the reargument decision as a 
“political gesture unworthy of the Court” hung like a sword of 
Damocles over the Court’s reputation as well as a stinging insult to 
Justice Blackmun’s reputation.138 
 
Court to this will by manipulating assignments, the integrity of the institution is imperiled,” 
and the phrase “an action no Chief Justice in my time would ever have taken.”  Id. at 103.  He 
also changed the phrase “manipulated for unworthy objectives” to “frustrated.”  Id. at 104. 
136.  William O. Douglas, Sixth Draft of Dissent to Order for Reargument in Roe v. 
Wade and Doe v. Bolton (June 13, 1972), in Opinion Writing Database: Roe v. Wade, supra 
note 122; see WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at 187–88. 
137.  WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at 187. 
138.  After Justice Douglas’s memo leaked to the press on July 4, 1972, see Move by 
Burger May Shift Court’s Stand on Abortion, WASH. POST, July 4, 1972, at A1, cited in 
GARROW, supra note 104, at 557–60 & 866 n.99, Justice Douglas wrote Chief Justice Burger a 
handwritten note saying he was “upset and appalled” at  
the nasty story about the abortion cases . . . . 
. . .  I have never breathed a word concerning the cases or my memo to anyone 
outside the Court. . . . 
We have our difference; but so far as I am concerned they are wholly internal; 
and if revealed, they are mirrored in opinion files, never in “leaks” to the press. 
Letter from William O. Douglas, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, to 
Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (July 4, 1972), quoted in 
GARROW, supra note 104, at 558.  Inviting Burger and his wife Vera to visit him and his wife 
Cathy in Goose Prairie, he signed the letter “[w]ith affectionate regards.”  Id. 
Chief Justice Burger responded to Justice Douglas on July 27th after the Term ended to 
refute some of his charges.  His memo reflects the extraordinary pressures the Court faced 
and the unprecedented nature of Justice Douglas’s threatened dissent: 
1. It is not accurate, as you state, that “The Chief Justice represented the 
minority view in the Conference” on the abortion cases, unless you add that there 
was no majority for any firm position.  On the Texas case there was a consensus, if 
not unanimity, that the Texas statute had to fall.  There were varying views as to the 
basis.  No one’s notes are controlling nor likely to be comprehensive, or even 
precisely accurate.  Mine are “final disposition to wait on writing and grounds” as to 
both cases. 
My notes show, and my recollection is the same, that on the Georgia case there 
was no “majority” in the sense of identifying the assigning author.  It is not in accord 
with my records of the Conference or my recollection that “out of the seven there 
were four who initially took a majority view,” as you state.  There simply was no 
majority for any clear-cut disposition on all issues or even the basic issues, and that 
is not at all unusual in a case of this kind.  Some of us saw one aspect of infirmity in 
the Georgia statute; others saw different weaknesses.  The discussion was extended 
and positions altered in the course of it—which is also not unusual.  You are correct 
that you were not “in the majority,” primarily because no “majority” could be 
spelled out.  I would not try to characterize affirmatively any Justice’s position on all 
the facets of the Georgia case, but my notes reflect that Bill Brennan and Potter 
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Stewart were very near each other but they were not fully joined by others. 
Any implication that Bill Brennan or Potter would have had the assignment is 
not supported by my recollection or notes and if either of them entertained that 
thought, at the time or since, they have never mentioned it to me—as I surely would 
welcome their doing if they agreed with your recital of facts. 
That leaves Byron as next in line.  His position does not suggest—nor has it 
ever—that he should have made the assignment.  Moreover, at this point it is 
obvious as a matter of arithmetic that Bryon, or any one junior to him, was in any 
“majority.”  Nor did Thurgood’s position suggest to him or others that he was senior 
of some “majority”—also by this stage mathematically impossible.  Thurgood has 
never suggested he should have assigned the case for writing. 
2. The correct evaluation of the Conference discussion, as I see it, was made 
by at least three Justices during the Conference, when they said their final position, 
in the Georgia case particularly, would “depend on how it is written”. 
3. I agree entirely the assignment function is “not merely a matter of 
protocol”.  On the contrary, it is a most arduous and time consuming operation and 
an important one.  Hughes had attributed to him the statement that it was one of the 
most difficult of his tasks. 
. . . . 
Your unprecedented proposed dissenting statement, now withdrawn, seems to 
imply bad faith if positions are not firm, fixed and final when a Conference adjourns.  
If a single member of the Court would endorse your view on this, I would be 
astonished.  The record, which I reexamined in detail after the surprising statements 
of your dissent, shows that I have never undertaken to assign from a minority 
position.  Thus there is not the slightest basis for your statement.  I would be 
interested in having you identify the cases in which you think that happened. 
To return to the abortion cases, in which you acknowledge you were not in the 
majority, you suggested, after the initial Conference, that I should not have assigned 
them to Harry because his view would not command a majority.  I do not recall that 
anyone joined you in your expression.  Subsequently, Harry did not undertake to 
submit an opinion but only a memorandum accompanied by his expression for 
reargument.  Your analysis of Harry’s position would appear somewhat faulty by 
your own prompt endorsement of his preliminary memorandum in these cases. . . . 
Your statement that the Texas and Georgia cases with a 7-man Court had “five 
votes” must be coupled—as you do not couple it—with the action of a majority of 
the Court to reargue these cases.  That action speaks for itself.  Brewster had a 
majority of the 7-man Court, but even though I was in the majority I urged that we 
reargue and the Court so voted.  Crucial constitutional issues should not be resolved 
by four of a 7-man Court when there are nine Justices at the time the case comes 
down. 
I appreciate your subsequent longhand notes, but with respect to your position 
on the abortion cases I write you now, as I said, to keep the record straight, and to 
allow any future scholar who may peruse the current press accounts or papers of 
Justices to have the “due process” benefit of all the facts in context, as I have tried 
to place them fairly.  I believe, if you “sort out” the sequence of events, you will 
agree the foregoing is a fair statement of the situation.  The abortion issues, like 
obscenity and others, are problems of extraordinary difficulty and we will need our 
best effort to achieve a reasonably satisfactory result.  
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With the Court thus roiled by the two abortion cases, another fragile 
coalition began to emerge in the equally difficult death penalty cases.  
On June 13th, Marshall recirculated his Eighth Amendment argument.  
Justices Douglas and Brennan had already joined, and Justice White 
was willing to concur but on a different ground.  That day Justice 
Stewart circulated his concurrence with the prospective majority per 
curiam also on a different ground.  The backlog of majority opinions, 
concurrences and dissents at the Print Shop was so great that Justice 
Stewart sent his concurrence around in Xeroxed draft form.139  It 
effectively meant that the death penalty statues of most states were 
struck down, although no single logic was agreeable to the majority.  
Each member of the majority would write separately.  Justice Brennan 
immediately proposed a per curiam holding simply that “[t]he Court 
holds that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these 
cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments.”140 
At the same time, the dissenting side firmed up as Justice Blackmun, 
after struggling with the death penalty, joined the respective opinions of 
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist, adding only his 
poignant personal reflections on capital punishment: 
Cases such as these provide for me an excruciating agony of the 
spirit.  I yield to no one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy, 
and, indeed, abhorrence, for the death penalty, with all its 
aspects of physical distress and fear and of moral judgment 
exercised by finite minds.  That distaste is buttressed by a belief 
that capital punishment serves no useful purpose that can be 
demonstrated.  For me, it violates childhood’s training and life’s 
experiences, and is not compatible with the philosophical 
 
Vera [Chief Justice Burger’s wife] joins in wishing you and Cathy a good 
summer and that Cathy will recover promptly from her virus in the clear, clean air of 
your mountain. 
Regards, 
WEB [signed] 
Memorandum from Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, to 
William O. Douglas, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (July 27, 1972) 
(emphasis added), in Opinion Writing Database: Roe v. Wade, supra note 122. 
139.  Memorandum from Potter Stewart, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to the Conference (June 13, 1972), in The Burger Court Opinion Writing 
Database: Furman v. Georgia, http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1971/
69-5003.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/D749-NA6Z, in WAHLBECK, ET AL., 
OPINION-WRITING DATABASE, supra note 100. 
140.  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam). 
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convictions I have been able to develop.  It is antagonistic to any 
sense of “reverence for life.”  Were I a legislator, I would vote 
against the death penalty for the policy reasons argued by 
counsel for the respective petitioners and expressed and adopted 
in the several opinions filed by the Justices who vote to reverse 
these convictions.141 
Justice Powell, who was disappointed that his opinion upholding the 
death penalty had not carried a majority, continued to tinker with his 
opinion hoping he could persuade either Justice Stewart or Justice 
White to switch.  He emphasized the long, unbroken line of precedents 
upholding the death penalty and the fact that the question of the jury’s 
discretion to impose the death penalty had been decided the year before 
in the McGautha case, a decision in which both Justices Stewart and 
White had joined.142  If he could persuade either one, he could still have 
his majority. 
Justice Douglas had asked that the death penalty decision not come 
down for another two weeks, the last day of the Term, so he could revise 
his concurrence.  He told Justice Brennan that he wished to add a 
footnote noting the same very weakness Justice Powell had pointed out, 
that the decision in effect overruled McGautha without saying so. 
Justice Brennan worried that the logic of Justice Douglas’s 
concurrence might push Justices White and Stewart back to upholding 
the statutes.  While the 5–4 majority to strike down the capital 
punishment standards existed, it was technically not in place.  The 
coalition would have to survive until the last day of the Term, when the 
decision with its nine separate opinions totaling 50,000 words and 232 
pages would be announced. 
The next day, June 14th, Justice Blackmun finally circulated his first 
draft of the Moore case, the only one of the death penalty cases that 
remained before them on other grounds.  At January conference, eight 
members of the Court—everyone but Justice Rehnquist—agreed the 
case should be remanded for a new trial.  The Chief had assigned the 
case to Justice Blackmun based on a consensus of six Justices (Burger, 
Douglas, Steward, White, Powell and Blackmun) who agreed that the 
exclusion of jurors who did not favor capital punishment violated the 
 
141.  Harry A. Blackmun, Fourth Draft of Dissent from Furman v. Georgia (June 21, 
1972), in 69-5003 Furman v. Georgia, Part 13, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archi
ves/69-5003_FurmanGeorgia13.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/T976-DNSL, in POWELL 
PAPERS, supra note 57. 
142.  See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971). 
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Witherspoon case.  But now, anticipating the upcoming announcement 
that the death penalty statues had been struck down, Justice Blackmun 
noted in his cover note that since there was no longer a death penalty 
issue, the Witherspoon doctrine no longer needed to be addressed.143 
At conference the previous January, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and 
Stewart, at least tentatively, had indicated that they believed there was a 
Brady violation because of the evidence which had been withheld by the 
prosecutors.144  Justices Douglas, White, and Powell had thought the 
Brady issue was marginal and insufficient to justify a Brady violation 
finding.  The Chief had been silent on the issue at conference, having 
only agreed on the remand on the Witherspoon issue.  But now Justice 
Blackmun’s first memorandum indicated that he did not find the 
evidence withheld to be a sufficient Brady violation to require reversal; 
the Court should affirm the conviction.  Based on what had been said at 
conference, Justice Blackmun would still have a 5- or 6-man majority.145 
The next day (June 15th), Justice Stewart told Justice Blackmun he 
was “not . . . at rest” with Justice Blackmun’s argument.146  A day later, 
Justice Marshall circulated a typescript draft dissenting on the basis that 
Moore was denied a fair trial by the Brady violations relating to the 
prosecutors withholding of evidence about the misidentification of 
Moore by key witnesses. 
Over the next week, Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and 
Rehnquist joined the Blackmun draft.  Justice Powell reviewed the 
Blackmun draft and the Marshall draft and noted to his clerks that he 
would probably join Justice Blackmun’s opinion because the issues were 
“essentially factual—e.g. materiality of [the evidence] not disclosed”—
 
143.  Memorandum from Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to the Conference (June 14, 1972), in The Burger Court Opinion Writing 
Database: Moore v. Illinois [hereinafter Opinion Writing Database: Moore v. Illinois], 
http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1971/69-5001.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/62AU-JZ6W, in WAHLBECK, ET AL., OPINION-WRITING DATABASE, supra note 
100. 
144.  According to Justice Powell’s conference notes, there were five votes to affirm the 
case on its merits, with Justice Douglas leaning that way.  Lewis F. Powell, Conference Notes 
from Moore v. Illinois (Jan. 24, 1972), in 69-5001 Moore v. Illinois, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptim
ages/powell%20archives/69-5001_MooreIllinois.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G4LA-4H2T, 
in POWELL PAPERS, supra note 57. 
145.  Harry A. Blackmun, First Draft of Moore v. Illinois (June 14, 1972), in 69-5001 
Moore v. Illinois, supra note 144. 
146.  Memorandum from Potter Stewart, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States 
(June 15, 1972), in Opinion Writing Database: Moore v. Illinois, supra note 143. 
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and the Illinois court was “better equipped than we to decide.”147  If 
Justice Powell went ahead and joined him, Justice Blackmun would 
have a five-man majority in Moore even without Justice Douglas. 
At this point, the controversy over the abortion cases came back into 
play.  Justices Douglas and Blackmun talked about Justice Douglas’s 
incendiary dissent to putting the abortion cases over for reargument.  
“Douglas refused [once again] to withdraw his dissent until Blackmun 
personally assured him that his position of declaring the abortion statues 
unconstitutional was firm, and that he had no intention of reversing that 
position after reargument.”148  Justice Blackmun agreed.149  On June 
19th, Justice Douglas withdrew his lengthy dissent and agreed to simply 
note he was dissenting to the reargument order.150 
On June 20th, Justice Blackmun got two unexpected pieces of good 
news about his opinion draft of Moore v. Illinois.  Justice Blackmun 
received a cryptic note from Justice Douglas saying, “I acquiesce in your 
Parts I to IV.”151  That same day, Justice Brennan joined Justice 
Blackmun’s Moore v. Illinois opinion.  Now Justice Blackmun’s 
majority, if Justice Powell stayed with him, would be 7–2! 
However, within days the tide shifted away from Justice Blackmun’s 
Moore v. Illinois.  On June 22nd, Justices Stewart and Douglas joined 
Justice Marshall’s dissent.  Justice Blackmun was back to 6–3, provided 
he held on to Justice Powell’s vote. 
 
147.  Lewis F. Powell, Annotations to Harry A Blackmun, First Draft of Moore v. 
Illinois (June 16, 1972), in 69-5001 Moore v. Illinois, supra note 144. 
148.  SIMON, supra note 134, at 104. 
149.  Id. at 104 (citing Interview by James F. Simon with Harry A. Blackmun, Associate 
Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash., D.C. (Nov. 16, 1992)). 
150.  Lewis F. Powell, Annotations to William O. Douglas, Sixth Draft of Dissent to 
Order for Reargument in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton (June 13, 1972), in 70-18 Roe v. 
Wade, supra note 106; see also Roe v. Wade, 408 U.S. 919 (1972) (granting reargument) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Doe v. Bolton, 408 U.S. 919 (1972) (granting reargument) (Douglas, 
J., dissenting). 
151.  See William O. Douglas, Annotations to Memorandum from Harry A. Blackmun, 
Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, to the Conference (June 14, 1972), in 
Opinion Writing Database: Moore v. Illinois, supra note 143, showing a handwritten note by 
Justice Douglas: “Dear Harry—I think this suggested Part V as amended by Potter is OK.  
Please Join me.  I acquiesce in your Parts I to IV.”  This was written on Justice Blackmun’s 
memo of a week earlier when Justice Douglas was presumably in Goose Prairie starting his 
summer break.  Mail was often delayed.  The handwritten note has no date.  Justice 
Blackmun’s chambers’ apparently typed version is dated June 21, 1972, which is probably the 
date Justice Blackmun received it rather than the day it was written.  See Copy of 
Handwritten Note by WOD (June 21, 1972), in Opinion Writing Database: Moore v. Illinois, 
supra note 143. 
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Justice Powell’s clerk had reviewed the evidence again and wrote a 
second case memo noting that the “trial was a mockery of due process” 
and recommending that Justice Powell join Justice Marshall’s dissent.152  
On June 27th, Powell joined Marshall’s dissent, noting privately that “I 
expect the defendant is guilty as charged, but you have persuaded me 
that he did not receive a fair trial.”153  Now Blackmun’s majority was 
back to 5–4. 
We do not know the precise date that Paul Hoeber went back to 
Justice Brennan about changing his vote, but it was likely in the next few 
days.  In this context, an appeal to Justice Brennan on the facts as 
Justice Marshall presented them may have seemed like it would have a 
high likelihood for success given his original conference vote that this 
was a Brady violation.  A Brennan switch would give Justice Marshall a 
5–4 majority and reaffirm the line of Brady cases that prevented 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
As we wrote in The Brethren, Justice Brennan was encouraged that 
Justice Blackmun had seemed more independent of the Chief Justice 
but was concerned that if he voted against Justice Blackmun at this 
point, “it might make it more difficult to reach him in the abortion 
cases. . . .  Marshall’s clerk made a final appeal through Brennan’s 
clerks.  Brennan had his priorities.  His priority in this case was Harry 
Blackmun.  There would be no new trial for ‘Slick’ Moore.”154 
From what we have been able to determine—with the exception of 
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan—other Justices did not 
complain of specific errors in the reporting we did on cases, albeit there 
were many pro forma denials among Justices that they had made the 
remarks about each other that were attributed to them. 
 
152.  Memorandum from Arthur Fox, Law Clerk, to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Associate 
Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (June 20, 1972), in 69-5001 Moore v. Illinois, 
supra note 144. 
153.  Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to Thurgood Marshall, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States 
(June 27, 1972), in Opinion Writing Database: Moore v. Illinois, supra note 143. 
154.  WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at 225.  Another indication that 
Brennan and Marshall clerks found it hard to understand why Justice Brennan refused to join 
Justice Marshall’s opinion to make a majority was the fact that three months earlier Justice 
Brennan had joined Justice Marshall’s dissent in Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972).  In 
that case, Justice Marshall objected to the Court’s finding of harmless error when the 
confession of a codefendant who did not take the stand was admitted at trial, which the 
Court’s majority agreed had deprived a defendant of his right under the Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause. 
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Fortunately, the personal papers of Justices Douglas, Marshall, and 
Blackmun have collectively confirmed most of the controversial details 
in the book.155 
At the Marquette conference and elsewhere there has been 
considerable speculation and concern that clerks may be the true 
authors of Supreme Court opinions.  This was not our experience.  One 
of the rare examples of a heavily clerk-influenced opinion was the 
O’Connor v. Donaldson156 case about the rights of involuntarily 
committed mental health patients.  A Powell clerk named Joel Klein,157 
who was familiar with the case from his previous work at the Mental 
Health Law Project, played an unusual role in educating the Court and 
in actively organizing the clerks to shape an alternative opinion to Chief 
Justice Burger’s attempt to strike any “right to treatment” from federal 
law.158  Even in this extraordinary instance, Klein did not “write” the 
opinion.  In fact, he barely was able to convince his own Justice, Powell, 
to join the eventual majority opinion written by Justice Stewart. 
Throughout The Brethren, we illustrated the irreverent style of 
Justice Marshall, including a proclivity to watch daytime television in his 
chambers and a commitment to a short day in chambers.  In retrospect, I 
believe our references to what clerks in other chambers thought of 
Justice Marshall misled many readers.159  The general view in other 
chambers of Justice Marshall as “laid back” and less prepared than his 
peers was perceived by some readers as showing a contempt on the part 
of Marshall clerks toward their boss.  In fact, what we heard from 
Marshall clerks was generally a deep affection, admiration, and respect 
 
155.  New York Times reporter Linda Greenhouse concluded in her biography of Justice 
Blackmun that “Blackmun’s case files attest to [The Brethren’s] accuracy.”  LINDA 
GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S SUPREME COURT 
JOURNEY 254 (2005).  Mark Tushnet, a Marshall clerk during one of the Terms we cover and 
Constitutional scholar, said, “The Brethren has been controversial, but on most particulars 
and in its general depiction of the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Burger, its accuracy has 
not been impugned.”  Mark Tushnet, Thurgood Marshall and the Brethren, 80 GEO. L.J. 2109, 
2109 n.2 (1992); see also Garrow, supra note 54. 
156.  422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
157.  After clerking, Klein joined the Mental Health Law Project and later served in the 
White House Counsel’s office, as Assistant Attorney General in the Antitrust Division, and 
as New York City School Chancellor under Mayor Michael Bloomberg. 
158.  See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at 369–83. 
159.  Since even our former colleague Juan Williams has suggested that our account of 
Justice Marshall’s informal and often jocular manner was a depiction of Justice Marshall as 
lazy or uncaring, I take responsibility for insufficiently emphasizing his passion and clear 
direction more clearly.  See JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN 
REVOLUTIONARY 369–71 (1998). 
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for Justice Marshall.160  While Marshall clerks were given more latitude 
in the initial drafting of opinions and dissents than clerks in other 
chambers, the logic, the reasoning, the points of law, and—most of all—
the passion were Justice Marshall’s.  Justice Marshall was as sure of his 
position on cases as any other Justice.  Justice Marshall was one of  the 
most experienced litigators to sit on the Court during the seven years we 
covered and was by far the most street savvy Justice in matters of racial 
discrimination, criminal law, and labor relations.  Justice Marshall knew 
what he wanted to convey and why.161 
Generally, I would submit that a clerk’s undue influence over an 
opinion is a non-issue.  The influence a clerk might have on a Justice 
and the Justice’s opinions is more a matter of the clerk’s background 
and personal relationship with the Justice.  Clerks who bring more 
diversity of class and race, more practical real-world experience, and a 
deeper interest in American society and its government can bring 
valuable insights and sensitivity to the Justices they serve.  I suspect a 
majority of the current members of the Court, as portrayed at the 
Marquette conference, prefer clerks with a greater ideological affinity 
and less extensive real world experience.  The current system in which 
most clerks are burdened with substantial educational bills yields more 
clerks who feel they must devote much of their career to corporate law.  
This bias has become even more pronounced by the Justices’ need to 
survive grueling confirmation processes which increasingly favor 
nominees who eschew anything or anyone controversial. 
 
160.  The one exception to this general characterization of Justice Marshall’s clerks 
respect for the Justice was the case of Schlesinger v. Holtzmann, 414 U.S. 1321 (1973), in 
which Justice Marshall was reluctant as the lone Circuit Justice for the Second Circuit to 
restore an emergency injunction halting the bombing of Cambodia until the Court could hear 
the case.  WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at 277.  When Justice Douglas 
indicated he might act unilaterally, Justice Marshall polled his colleagues, who agreed with 
him that he should not reinstate the injunction but instead write a rather complicated order 
explaining why not.  Id. at 277–78.  When Justice Marshall asked his avidly antiwar clerk to 
assist, the clerk, frustrated by Justice Marshall’s timidity, balked at helping to write the longer 
opinion, and Justice Marshall issued a brief order instead.  Id. at 278. 
161.  Mark Tushnet, a former Marshall clerk during the 1972 Term, currently a professor 
of law, has written a commendably detailed law journal article that makes this point better 
than we did in The Brethren.  See Tushnet, supra note 155.  Tushnet argues that as the Warren 
Court was replaced by the ever more conservative Burger Court, Justice Marshall found 
himself primarily writing in dissent.  Id. at 2128.  Moreover, his experience as a “senior 
partner in a [very active] small law firm, the legal department of the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People,” meant Justice Marshall was accustomed to and 
comfortable as a delegator and motivator, as opposed to the “hands-on micromanagement” 
style of other Justices.  Id. at 2111–12. 
 438 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:387 
If the day ever returns where a President can appoint Justices with 
broader interests and more creative decision-making processes, I hope 
that future clerks can make the kind of contributions to their Justices 
that the Brethren clerks made during their service.  Indeed, I would 
hope that they would also take seriously the need to clarify the past two 
decades of the Court’s inner workings.  There have been no detailed 
accounts of the dynamics which produced the cases which chose the 
forty-third President of the United States, abolished limits of campaign 
contributions, restricted the ability of cities to control handguns, 
permited same-sex marriage, upheld national healthcare, broadened 
religious freedom to include corporations, diluted the Justice 
Department’s ability to enforce election law fairness, struck down a ban 
on protests near abortion clinics, let stand Texas restrictions on voting 
without ID’s, and other important issues.162 
Without candid firsthand accounts that thoughtfully explain the 
Court’s recent Terms, the public is left with the shallowest of partisan 
portrayals.  When The Brethren explained the Court’s handling of the 
Nixon tapes case, many readers were shocked by the secret infighting 
that had produced the decision.  Today’s college students who read The 
Brethren as their first exposure to the Court’s internal deliberations 
have a much different reaction.  They marvel at how principled the 
Brethren Court seems compared to the contemporary Supreme Court’s 
presumed raw political wrangling.  The public view of the individual 
Justices is once again as poorly informed as it has ever been, relying 
most often on caricatures based on their political backgrounds, their 
religions, their voting patterns, or superficial courtroom patterns of 
conduct. 
It is my hope that once again Justices and their clerks will find that 
they too have an obligation to assure that the Court’s processes and 
dynamics are better understood, and that they will once again share that 
information in a candid and serious manner.163 
 
162.  See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 
(2013); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); 
Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014); 
Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9 (2014).  I am unaware of any other in depth accounts discussing 
the Court’s internal deliberation of key cases, apart from two: LAZARUS, supra note 75, and 
David Margolick, Evgenia Peretz & Michael Shnayerson, The Path to Florida, VANITY FAIR, 
Oct. 2004, at 310, which discusses the Court’s handling of Bush v. Gore in detail.  
163.  Many commentators have discussed the impact of the Code of Conduct for Law 
Clerks of the Supreme Court of the United States on the ability of law clerks to discuss their 
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work.  See, e.g., Kozinski, supra note 75.  In fact, with the authorization of their Justice, there 
is no constraint.  Moreover, there is considerable guidance that can be offered without 
violating any confidentiality agreement.  And of course there is no constraint on the part of a 
Justice.  It is reasonable to assume, as we did in The Brethren, that unattributable guidance 
“on background” has institutional advantages.  See Judge Alex Kozinski’s reflections on the 
Lazarus book in Conduct Unbecoming, a book review in the Yale Law Journal.  Id. 
